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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN CORPORATE FINANCE
by
Milos Vulanovic

Adviser: Professor Armen Hovakimian
This dissertation consists of two essays on corporate finance. In the first essay we
test the pecking order theory by examining how firms finance maturing long-term debt.
This allows us to accomplish three goals: resolve the issues of debt capacity and the
endogeneity of financing deficit; examine the role of internal financing; and generate
evidence regarding the order in which different sources of financing are used. We
determine that firms use internal funds before they issue new debt to refinance maturing
long-term debt. Firms with more cash on hand are less likely to issue new debt to
refinance. On average, each marginal dollar of maturing long-term debt is fully financed
with the issuance of new debt.
In the second essay, we study characteristics of Specified Purpose Acquisition
Companies (SPACs) and examine the performance of their securities over time. We find
that SPACs represent a fairly unique way to raise capital, The incentives of their
founders, underwriters, and investors are interdependent and successful business
combinations generally result in significant returns to founders.

We also show that

different SPAC securities generate different reactions in response to the announcement

iii

news regarding their corporate status. While holders of all three securities realize
abnormal returns on the announcement day, the strongest reaction is observed among the
investors holding warrants, while common stock holders tend to react very mildly.
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ESSAY 1

Corporate Financing of Maturing Long-Term Debt

1.

Introduction
Although the pecking order theory has long been one of the primary contenders to

being the provider of the most accurate description of corporate financing behavior,
direct empirical tests of its predictions have become a subject of intense effort only
recently. 1 Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) (thereafter, SSM) use regressions of debt
financing on financing deficit to test the pecking order theory on a sample of 157 large
US public firms with continuous data covering 1971-1989 time period. Based on the
finding that 70-80 percent of financing deficit is covered with debt issuance, they
conclude that the pecking order theory provides good first order approximation of
corporate financing behavior.
Chirinko and Singh (2000), however, argue that the regression of debt financing
on financial deficit is unable to identify the order in which funds from various sources are
used. Furthermore, the approach cannot properly address situations in which firms have
to issue high percentage of equity, for example, due to limited debt capacity.
Frank and Goyal (2003) examine the robustness of SSM findings by estimating
SSM-style regressions on a broader sample of publicly trading firms covering a longer
time period. They find that the proportion of debt in total financing is much lower in this
1

Donaldson (1961) observes that firms finance their investment opportunities in a certain order: first
internal fund, then external debt, and external equity in the end. Myers and Majluf (1984) provide
theoretical foundation for this financing hierarchy, known as the pecking order theory, based on existence
of information asymmetry between managers and outside investors.
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broader sample and that it further declines after 1990. They further find that the pecking
order theory does especially poor job in explaining the financing behavior of small firms.
This finding is puzzling as small firms are likely to be subject to a higher degree of
information asymmetry and, thus, should be more likely to follow the pecking order. 2
Lemmon and Zender (2007) offer an explanation for the “puzzle” by arguing that small
firms are unable to issue additional debt because of their limited debt capacity. 3
Leary and Roberts (2007), on the other hand, argue that the pecking order theory
not only is unable to explain corporate financing behavior as a whole, but also fails to
explain corporate financing choices of firms considered by the literature as good
candidates for pecking order behavior. Specifically, the pecking order theory does not
perform well in explaining how firms that face information asymmetry but are not
constrained by debt capacity finance their investment opportunities.
In this paper, we test the pecking order theory by examining how firms finance
maturing long-term debt. Our focus on the financing of maturing debt has certain
advantages and resolves some of the issues from the previous literature. First, debt
capacity is much less of an issue due to the fact that maturing debt frees up capacity for
new debt issuance. Second, maturing debt is an ex-ante measure of financing needs that
can be satisfied from internal funds as well as external debt and equity. As such, it allows
us not only to test whether firms follow the pecking order when they choose between
external debt and external equity, but also to contrast external financing to internal
2

Fama and French (2002) confirm that the pecking order theory cannot explain financing patterns of small
growth firms. In contrast, Bharath, Pasquariello, and Wu (2006) and Gomes and Phillips (2007) find that
fraction of debt used to cover financing deficit increases with the extent of information asymmetry. Bharath
et al. (2006) use market proxies of information asymmetry, whereas Gomes and Phillips (2007) use analyst
forecast dispersion and earnings surprises as measures of information asymmetry.
3
The idea that debt capacity can constrain a firm’s ability to borrow and lead to violations of the pecking
order of financing is discussed in Donaldson (1961), Myers (1984), Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), but
is not explicitly tested.
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financing. Third, the timing and the amount of maturing of debt are exogenous with
respect to the form of financing, which allows a cleaner interpretation of the results.
Finally, the exogeneity of maturing debt allows us to identify the order in which firms tap
different sources of funds by examining the relation between the amount of maturing debt
and the form of financing used.
Some of the previous studies consider maturing debt in their analyses. ShyamSunder and Myers (1999) include current maturity long-term debt in their financing
deficit measure. Frank and Goyal (2003) also consider current maturity long-term debt
but argue for its exclusion from financing deficit. Unlike these studies, however, we not
only consider current maturity long-term debt as the only exogenous component of
financing deficit but also include it in our measure of net debt issued. Our rationale for
this is simple. The timing and the amount of current maturity long-term debt are
determined by the decisions made prior to the current year. The only decision being made
at the time of maturity is how to finance the amount due. Therefore, a decision, for
example, to refinance 100% of the maturing debt with new debt should be considered a
decision to issue debt just like a decision to finance it with new equity is considered an
equity issue.
Using a sample of public firms from 1970-2006 period, we first estimate SSMstyle regressions of debt financing on financial deficit. Overall, in our sample, more than
forty percent of financing deficit is financed with debt issuance. Furthermore, the fraction
of internal shortfall of funds financed with debt issuance is higher prior to 1990, but
declines afterward. In addition, we find that the importance of debt issuance is higher for

3

larger firms and for firms with credit ratings. These results confirm the findings of earlier
studies and provide baseline set of results to which our main results are compared.
The introduction of current maturity long-term debt instead of financing deficit in
SSM-style regressions significantly improves the performance of the pecking order
model. In the overall sample, we find that each marginal dollar of maturing long-term
debt is fully financed with new debt issuance, consistent with the pecking order
prediction that firms prefer debt to equity issuance. Furthermore, debt issuance remains
highly important in subsamples based on time period, size, and existence of rating. Even
more importantly, the observed differences across subsamples are consistent with the
predictions of the pecking order theory. In particular, the proportion of new debt used to
refinance maturing debt is higher for smaller firms and for firms without credit ratings.
These patterns are opposite to the patterns for financing deficit reported in the earlier
literature.
The pecking order theory not only predicts that firms prefer debt to equity
issuance, but also that they would first use internal funds to pay off maturing debt and
only after that would turn to debt. In other words, small amounts of maturing debt should
be financed with cash. Firms should start issuing new debt only after the amount of
maturing debt exceeds the firm’s ability to pay it off from internal funds.
Our findings confirm these predictions. We find that an average firm finances its
maturing debt with internal funds first. As the amount of maturing debt increases, each
additional dollar of maturing debt becomes fully financed with new debt issuance. These
findings are stronger for firms that are more likely to be subject to a greater degree of

4

information asymmetry as well as for firms with more cash on hand, consistent with the
pecking order theory.
Although maturing debt releases capacity for new debt issuance, cross-sectional
variation in the incremental debt capacity induces variation in how different firms finance
their maturing debt. Specifically, we find that the fraction of new debt used to refinance
the marginal dollar of maturing debt declines with the extent to which the firm is close to
its debt capacity. However, we also find that, regardless of their spare debt capacity,
firms always prefer internal funds to external debt.
The pecking order theory also predicts that firms would never issue equity if they
could instead use internal funds. This implies that the results of regressions of total
external financing on maturing debt should be similar to the results we obtained for
regressions of debt issuance. However, this hypothesis is rejected in our data.
These results suggest that firms may be issuing equity out of the pecking order.
To gain additional insight into how new debt and equity issues are used to finance
maturing debt, we examine plots of the amounts of debt and equity issued against the
amounts of maturing debt. While we observe a distinct positive relation between the
amount of maturing debt and the amount of new debt issued, there is no discernable
relation between maturing debt and equity issuance. Furthermore, the vast majority of
equity issues, both large and small, are concentrated at low levels of maturing debt,
suggesting that equity issues are primarily used to finance other, e.g., investment, needs
and not to refinance maturing debt. Given our focus on the latter, whether these equity
issues violate the pecking order is beyond the scope of the current paper. Indeed, Leary
and Roberts (2007) focus on how firms finance their investment needs and find that the

5

pecking order theory does not perform well in predicting corporate financing decisions of
these firms.
To summarize, we find that firms follow the pecking order of financing when they
refinance the current maturity long-term debt. These firms first use the accumulated cash,
then issue new long-term debt to pay off their maturing debt. External equity does not
play a significant role in refinancing of maturing debt.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the data
and define the variables. In section 3, the regression models are explained and the main
results are presented. Ordering tests are in section 4. Section 5 considers the effects of
debt capacity. Section 6 summarizes our findings.
2. Sample and variables
We start with all firms available on Compustat for the period from 1970 to 2006.
The coverage of flow of funds statements, which we need for our analyses, starts in 1971.
An additional year (1970) is used as our financing variables are scaled by total assets
from the end of the previous year. 4 To take into consideration outliers and possibly
misreported data, all scaled variables are trimmed at one percent on both tails of the
distribution. 5 We exclude financial firms (SIC 6000-6999), firms with book values of
assets or sales less than one million dollars, and observations with missing values of
relevant variables. In addition, since the primary focus of this study is on how firms
refinance their maturing debt, we limit ourselves to firms with nonzero values of

4
5

Total assets is Compustat data 6.
We do not trim censored variables on the censored side.
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maturing debt. 6 Our final sample consists of 113,768 firm-year observations covering
corporate financing activity in 1971-2006.
Several variables, such as financing deficit, play an important role in the pecking
order tests of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). Using SSM definitions and notation, the
financing deficit is defined as follows.
DEFt = DIVt + Xt + ΔWt - Ct + Rt,

(1)

where, DEFt is financing deficit, DIVt measures cash dividends, Xt denotes capital
expenditures, ΔWt is change in net working capital, Ct is cash flow after interest and
taxes, and Rt is the portion of outstanding long-term debt that matures during year t.
As noted in Frank and Goyal (2003), the requirement that sources and uses of
funds balance each other implies the following accounting cash flow identity:
DIVt + Xt + ΔWt - Ct = NEISt + NDISt.

(2)

In (2), NEISt is net amount of equity issued and NDISt is net amount of long-term debt
issued during year t. 7 Taking into account (2), equation (1) can be rewritten as
DEFt = NEISt + (NDISt + Rt) = NEISt + NDISRt.

(3)

In (3), NDISRt is net amount of long-term debt issued during year t including long-term
debt used to refinance the portion of outstanding long-term debt that matures in year t. 8

6

Eighty percent of our sample firms have nonzero current maturity long-term debt.

7

Net equity issued is defined as equity issued (data 108) minus equity repurchased (data 115). Net debt
issued is defined as long-term debt issuance (data 111) minus long-term debt reduction (data 114). For
observations with format code 1, long-term debt reduction data item in Compustat includes reclassification
of long-term debt that becomes due within one year as short-term debt. We restore the consistency of the
definition of long-term debt reduction by adding debt due in one year (data 44) to long-term debt reduction
(data 114) when format code is 1.
8
NDISR is long-term debt issuance minus long-term debt reduction plus one year lagged value of debt due
in one year.
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Summary statistics for variables important for our analyses are presented in Table
1. The current maturity long term debt for the average firm in the sample is 3.3% of total
assets. This is similar to Frank and Goyal (2003), who report the ratio of maturing longterm debt to be four percent of net assets of an average firm. While the average firm is a
net issuer of equity in the amount of 4.5 percent of total assets, most firms do not enter
equity markets in any given year at all. The average firm in the sample is a net debt issuer
in the amount of 5.2 percent of its total assets. The level of cash for the average firm is
9.6 percent of total assets. The average size of financing deficit is also 9.6 percent of total
assets. Around twenty-four percent of the analyzed firms have credit ratings. Almost half
of new debt financing raised by a median firm is used to refinance maturing long-term
debt, suggesting that it is an important reason for why firms issue new debt. 9
3. Traditional Pecking Order Theory Tests
3.1. Research design
In our analysis, we estimate two SSM-style regressions of debt issuance on two
measures of corporate financing needs. First, we test the relation between financing
deficit, DEF, and net long-term debt issuance, NDISR, using the original SSM regression
equation:
NDISRit = α + β×DEFit + εit.

(4)

According to the SSM hypothesis, we should expect α=0 and β=1, which would
provide support for the pecking order prediction that managers finance shortfalls of
internal funds solely with net debt issuance. We estimate this regression on our overall
9

We report only the median of the ratio of maturing debt to new debt financing as the other statistics are
severely affected by extreme observations of this variable.
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sample and in various subsamples to confirm that the results of the earlier studies hold in
our sample and to generate a baseline set of results to which the results from our second
set of tests are compared.
For our main set of tests, we modify regression (4) by replacing the independent
variable, financing deficit, with one of its components -- the portion of outstanding longterm debt that matures within year t, R. 10
DISRit = α + β×Rit + εit.

(5)

The dependent variable in (5) is also modified. The traditional tests of the pecking
order theory using regression (4) assume symmetry in pecking order behavior for security
issues and repurchases. Positive values of financial deficit, DEF, represent a use of funds
that is financed by issuing debt (positive NDISR), whereas negative values of financial
deficit represent a surplus of funds that is used to retire debt (negative NDISR). Thus, for
both security issues and repurchases, the null hypothesis is that the coefficient on NDISR
in regression (4) should be one.
Similar to positive financial deficit, maturing debt is expected to be financed with
new debt issuance. Unlike financial deficit, maturing debt is strictly a use of funds
variable. None of its values imply existence of a surplus of funds that can be used to
repurchase additional securities. As a result, regression (5) can be used to test the
predictions of the pecking order theory only with respect to security issues but not with
respect to security repurchases. Accordingly, the dependent variable, NDISR, is
transformed from a variable that measures both debt issues and reductions into a measure

10

One way to look at regression model (5) is as an instrumental variable version of regression model (4)
with maturing debt serving as an instrument for financing deficit.

9

of debt issuance only, DISR. Specifically, DISR is formed by replacing all negative
values of NDISR with zeroes, to reflect the fact that there is no debt issuance in these
cases and other sources of funds are used to finance maturing debt, R.
With the dependent variable, DISR, censored at zero, regression equation (5) has
to be estimated as a Tobit regression. This model also lends itself as a natural
specification for testing the preference for internal funds under the pecking order
hypothesis. Specifically, whereas the independent variable, DEF, in equation (4) is, by
definition, the sum of new debt and equity issued, the independent variable, R, in
equation (5) is an ex ante measure of funds that are required to refinance maturing debt.
These funds can be generated internally or raised externally in the form of debt or
equity. The pecking order theory states that firms prefer internal financing to external
financing.
Figure 1 illustrates the implications of pecking order firm behavior on the relation
between the amount of maturing debt and debt issuance. Small amounts of maturing debt
that can be refinanced internally are paid off with cash with no debt issued. These are the
censored observations (to the left of point C), with new debt issuance at zero. Once they
exhaust internal sources of funds, firms start issuing new debt. These are the observations
to the right of point C, where debt issuance increases with the amount of maturing debt.
As Figure 1 illustrates, our expectations for the coefficient estimates in regression
(5) should be somewhat different from the expectations for the coefficient estimates in
regression (4). Specifically, with preference for internal financing (positive C) the
coefficient estimate for the intercept, α, in regression (5) should be negative.

10

We should stress that this identification strategy relies on the exogeneity of the
independent variable, R, in equation (5). 11 The same strategy cannot be applied to
equation (4) to identify the order in which debt and equity are issued. The independent
variable in (4), DEF, is endogenous, as it is simply the sum of new debt, DISR, and new
equity issued. If large (small) new issues tend to be of any particular type (debt or
equity), then the relation between DISR and DEF would depend on the magnitude of
DEF, which could induce the intercept in regression (4) to be non-zero.
Unlike the intercept, the estimate for the coefficient β on maturing long-term debt
is expected to be close to one, as in regression (4). Once the firm exhausts its internal
funds and turns to new debt, each additional dollar of maturing debt is expected to be
financed with a dollar of new debt. Debt capacity is not expected to be a significant
constraining factor since additional debt capacity is released by the maturing debt.
Our dataset represents an unbalanced panel of 113,768 firm-year observations.
We follow Fama and French (2002) and report in our tables the results obtained by
estimating cross-sectional Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions for each of our 36
sample years and then using the time series of parameter estimates to obtain their means
and standard deviations. This procedure addresses concerns that the t-statistics may be
affected by correlation across firms within each year. We then apply Newey-West (1987)
adjustment to the time-series standard errors and t-statistics to address concerns about
time-series correlation in the estimated coefficients.12 We have also estimated pooled

11

The amount of long-term debt maturing in the current year is a result of an endogenous maturity choice
decision made by the firm at the time the debt was issued. We expect that this choice was affected by the
firm’s characteristics at the time of issuance. The amount of maturing debt is exogenous, however, with
respect to firm characteristics and decisions made at maturity.
12
We use three lags in calculating Newey-West t-statistics.

11

cross-section time-series regressions with standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity
and within-firm and within-year clustering. 13 The conclusions of the paper are not
sensitive to these alternative estimation choices. Furthermore, the presented t-statistics
are generally more conservative than the unreported alternative estimates.
3.2. Full sample results
Table 2 reports the coefficient estimates for regressions (4) and (5). The tstatistics for the hypothesis that the slope coefficients in these regressions are equal to
one are reported in parentheses. We find that around forty three percent of financing
deficit is financed by net debt issuance. While that coefficient is not at all close to 1,
rejecting the original SSM hypothesis, it is comparable to the coefficient estimates
reported by Frank and Goyal (2003). The SSM hypothesis is also rejected for the
intercept, which, although economically small, is statistically significantly greater than
zero.
What is interesting, are the results from equation (5) regressing debt issuance on
the current maturity long-term debt. We find that firms, on average, finance 103.5 percent
of their maturing long-term debt with new debt issuance. The coefficient of 1.035 on the
maturing long-term debt is not statistically different from one, consistent with the
pecking order theory. In addition, the statistically significant negative intercept (-0.016) is
also consistent with the pecking order hypothesis that firms start issuing new debt only
after internal funds are depleted. Jointly, the estimates of the intercept (-0.016) and the
slope (1.035) suggest that, for an average firm, maturing debt in the amount of up to 1.6

13

Petersen (2008) recommends using firm-level clustered standard errors in corporate finance applications.
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percent of total assets is financed with cash, with larger amounts of maturing debt
triggering new debt issuance.
3.3. Size-based subsamples
We, next, reestimate our regressions for the subsamples considered in the prior
empirical studies of the pecking order theory. Specifically, Frank and Goyal (2003) find
that larger firms tend to finance a significantly larger portion of their financing deficit
with new debt. This is a puzzling result as it implies that the pecking order theory is a
better descriptor of the financing behavior of firms with a lower degree of information
asymmetry. Lemmon and Zender (2007) offer an explanation for the “puzzle” by arguing
that small firms are unable to issue additional debt because of their limited debt capacity.
Since maturing debt frees up capacity for new debt issuance, corporate financing choices
are less likely to be driven by debt capacity constraints when firms refinance their
maturing debt. Thus, we can test the debt capacity hypothesis by comparing the
estimation results of regressions (4) and (5) for subsamples based on firm size.
Each year, we group the sample firms into quartiles based on the dollar value of
annual sales. We then pool observations from different years but same size quartiles into
four size-based subsamples and estimate regressions (4) and (5) separately for each of
these subsamples. The results are presented in Table 3.
The results for regression (4) are similar to the results from the prior literature.
The coefficient estimates on financing deficit increase monotonically as we move from
the quartile of the smallest firms (0.333) to the quartile containing the largest firms
(0.785). These results imply that, compared to the smallest firms, the largest firms use
more than twice as much debt when covering their financing deficit.
13

In contrast, the coefficient estimates on maturing debt (regression (5))
monotonically decline as we move from the quartile of the smallest firms (1.110) to the
quartile containing the largest firms (0.889). This pattern is consistent with the
predictions of the pecking order theory as firms with a higher degree of information
asymmetry (smaller firms) rely more heavily on debt financing than do firms with less
information asymmetry.
Another interesting result is the pattern of intercepts in the regression reported in
Panel B. The most negative estimate (-0.028) is observed for firms in the smallest size
quartile. As we move across size quartiles, the intercepts become progressively less
negative, with the intercept for the largest firms (0.000) being statistically
indistinguishable from zero. This pattern is consistent with pecking order hypothesis that
firms with a higher degree of information asymmetry rely more on internal funds as they
incur higher costs of adverse selection when raising external financing.
Overall, the results in panels A and B of Table 3 are consistent with the
hypothesis that smaller firms generally operate closer to their debt capacity and,
therefore, have to rely on new debt to a lesser degree than do larger firms. Consistent
with this hypothesis, the slope coefficient estimates in panels A and B are closer in
magnitude for the largest firm quartile, but diverge as we move to smaller firm quartiles.
This suggests that the largest firms are relatively unconstrained by debt capacity both
when they refinance their maturing debt and when they cover financing deficit in general.
Smaller firms, on the other hand, are more constrained by debt capacity with the
constraint relaxing when they refinance maturing debt. Hence, the slope coefficient
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estimates from regression (5) (Panel B) become increasingly larger relative to the
coefficient estimates from regression (4) (Panel A) as we consider smaller firms.
3.4. Credit rating subsamples
In this section, we split our sample into two subsamples based on whether a firm
has a credit rating, which we use as a measure of access to public debt markets. Lemmon
and Zender (2007) provide an extensive discussion of the reasons why the existence of
rated debt should be related to the firm’s debt capacity. Specifically, firms with no credit
ratings tend to have more volatile cash flows and lower collateral value of assets, and
tend to be more informationally opaque to allow access to arms-length debt. These firms
also tend to have higher costs of financial distress, which is why they tend to borrow
from banks and other financial intermediaries that are efficient at reorganizing distressed
firms. As a result, even if these firms do prefer to finance internal shortfalls with debt,
some of them may be unable to do so.
Because of concerns about misidentifying firms that have chosen to rely on equity
financing despite having the capacity to issue rated debt as debt capacity constrained,
Lemmon and Zender (2007) use the predicted probability of having rated debt as their
primary indicator. These issues are less of a concern in the current study as we focus on
how firms refinance their pre-existing debt when it matures. We, therefore, use an
indicator of whether a firm has rated debt and do not generate probabilities of having
rated debt.
For this analysis, we use only data starting from 1986, the year Compustat starts
its coverage of credit ratings. The results for regression (4) are presented in Table 4,
Panel A. The results show that, whereas debt constrained firms finance only 27.3 percent
15

of their deficit with new debt issuance, their unconstrained counterparts with full access
to debt markets finance 81.6 percent of deficit with new debt. These results are consistent
with the findings in the earlier literature.
The results for regression (5) are presented in Panel B. Managers of rated firms
finance 91.3 percent of their maturing long-term debt with new debt issuance. This
number is larger but similar to the proportion of new debt (81.6 percent) they use to cover
their financing deficit, consistent with view that these firms are not very constrained in
terms of their access to debt markets. In contrast, for unrated firms the difference between
the fractions of new debt used to finance the maturing long term debt (107.6 percent) and
the fraction of new debt used to cover internal fund shortfall (27.3 percent) is much
larger. This suggests that firms with limited access to credit markets may have lower debt
capacity, which limits their ability to finance shortfalls of internal funds with additional
debt.
The intercept is insignificant in the case of rated firms, suggesting that adverse
selection costs are not a major concern for informationally transparent rated firms when
they issue debt. In contrast, the intercept is significantly different from zero for unrated
firms, suggesting that adverse selection costs incurred in the process of debt issuance are
significant in the case of these informationally more opaque firms.
3.5. Subperiod results
Arguing that firms, as well as conditions under which they operate, change over
time, Frank and Goyal (2003) conduct separate tests of the pecking order hypothesis for
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the SSM (prior to 1990) and the post-SSM (after 1990) periods. 14 We do the same and
run regressions (4) and (5) separately for the period from 1971 to 1989 and for the period
from 1990 to 2006. Table 5 reports the results.
Consistent with Frank and Goyal (2003), we find that the slope coefficient
estimate in regression (4) is higher prior to 1990. As reported in Panel A, during the
1971-1989 time period, firms financed 54.5 percent of their shortfall of internal funds
with debt issuance. In contrast, only 27.9 percent of financing deficit is financed with
new debt after 1989. 15
Panel B presents the estimation results for regression (5) for the same two
subperiods. The results are quite different from those reported in Panel A. Specifically,
firms finance 100.6 percent of their maturing debt with new long-term debt issuance prior
to 1990, with the fraction of debt in refinancing of maturing long-term debt slightly rising
in the second half of our sample to reach 107.1 percent. One possible explanation for the
widely diverging results in Panels A and B could be that firms are operating much closer
to their debt capacity in the later period (after 1989). Consistent with this view, the credit
rating of an average firm in 1985 is BBB+, whereas the average rating in 2005 is between
BBB- and BB+, i.e., 2.5 notches lower.
To summarize, the patterns of how different types of firms fund their financing
deficit developed in this paper are consistent with prior literature and offer mixed support
for the pecking order theory. Replacing financing deficit with maturing long-term debt in
the SSM style regressions significantly strengthens the case for the pecking order theory.
14

Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) study data from the period 1971-1989
Huang and Ritter (2007) also report similar differences between the early and the late parts of their
sample.
15
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4. Order of financing
The results in Section II show that the original SSM hypothesis that firms
primarily rely on new debt financing is confirmed to a high degree when we focus on
how firms refinance their maturing long-term debt. In addition, the negative intercept
estimates for regression (5) indicate that firms fund maturing debt first from another
source of funds before turning to issuance of new debt. In this section, we test whether
the source of funds that precedes new debt is indeed internal cash as predicted by the
pecking order theory.
To identify the order of financing, we examine the relation between the amount of
cash held by the firm and the intercept in regression (5). Firms with more cash would be
able to refinance larger amounts of maturing debt without raising external funds. If firms
prefer internal funds to debt financing, then we should observe more negative intercepts
for firms with more cash on hand.
Panel A of Table 6 reports the coefficient estimates for regression (5) estimated
separately for firms grouped into quartiles based on accumulated cash. 16 The results are
consistent with the predictions of the pecking order theory. The intercept estimates are
negative for all cash quartiles, albeit insignificantly so for the first two quartiles. More
importantly, the intercepts monotonically decline (become more negative) with cash,
implying that firms prefer to use cash to refinance maturing debt and start issuing new
debt only when the amount of maturing debt becomes too large relative to the cash on
hand. For example, the coefficient estimates for firms in the highest quartile imply that an
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Cash is defined as cash and short-term investments (data 1) scaled by total assets.
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average firm in this quartile uses cash to pay off maturing debt in the amount of up to 4.4
percent of total assets, with higher values of maturing debt triggering new debt issuance.
Because adverse selection costs are higher when issuing equity than when issuing
debt, the pecking order theory predicts that internal funds not only precede debt but that
they precede external financing in general. To test this hypothesis we reestimate equation
(5) with total external financing (debt and equity) as the dependent variable separately for
each financial slack quartile. The results presented in Panel B are not consistent with the
pecking order theory. None of the intercepts are significantly negative and we observe no
monotonic pattern of changes in intercepts as we move from the lowest to the highest
cash quartile.
The conflicting results in Table 6 (cash precedes debt financing but does not
precede total external financing) suggest that firms may be issuing equity out of the
pecking order. To gain additional insight into how new debt and equity issues are used to
finance maturing debt, Figure 1 plots the amounts of debt issued against the amounts of
maturing debt whereas Figure 2 plots the amounts of equity issued against the amounts of
maturing debt. Figure 1 shows that, although there are many debt issues of various sizes
at low levels of maturing debt, there is a distinct positive relation between the amount of
maturing debt and the amount of new debt issued. In contrast, there is no discernable
relation between maturing debt and equity issuance in Figure 2. Combined with the fact
that most equity issues, both large and small, are observed at low levels of maturing debt,
this suggests that equity issues are primarily used to finance other, e.g., investment, needs
and not to refinance maturing debt. This is consistent with the findings in Leary and
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Roberts (2007) that firms do not follow the pecking order when they raise funds for their
investment projects.
5. Alternative interpretations and further tests
The finding that firms tend to refinance practically all of their maturing debt with
new debt issuance has an alternative interpretation. If an average firm is close to its target
debt level, then it is not surprising from the point of view of the tradeoff theory that it
maintains its target capital structure by simply rolling over its maturing debt. In this
section, we examine how measures of deviation from target affect the financing of
maturing debt. Because target leverage is not observable, we follow the standard
approach in the literature and proxy the target level of leverage with the predicted value
from the following regression.
LTDit = β0 + β1×LTDFit + β2×Sizeit + β3×MBit + β4×Tngit + β5×RDit + β6×RDDMit
+ β7×Expit + εit.

(6)

In (6), the dependent variable, LTD, is the long-term debt ratio. 17 Following
earlier research, the set of independent variables consists of firm characteristics believed
to proxy for the factors identified by the tradeoff theory as important determinants of the
target and includes firm size, asset tangibility (Tng), market-to-book (MB), research and
development expenses (RD), and selling expenses (Exp). 18 Because a large number of
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Long-term debt ratio is long-term debt (data 9) scaled by assets (data 6).
These variables have been previously considered by Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales
(1995), among others. Size is the natural log of sales (data 12), adjusted for inflation. Tangibility is the
property, plant, and equipment (data 8) scaled by total assets. R&D is the research and development
expense (data 46) scaled by sales. Selling expense is selling, general, and administrative expense (data 189)
over sales. Market-to-book is (total assets – book equity + market equity)/total assets. Book equity is the
book value of stockholders’ equity, plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit (if
available), minus the book value of preferred stock. Depending on availability, we use the redemption (data
56), liquidation (data 10), or par value (data 130) to estimate the book value of preferred stock.
Stockholders’ equity is (data 216), if it is available. If not, we measure stockholders’ equity as the book
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firms with no R&D do not report it, we set missing values for R&D to zero. Since firms
that do not report R&D may be different from those that do, we include an indicator
variable, RDDM, set to one for firms with non-missing R&D. Motivated by the finding in
Lemmon, Zender, and Roberts (2008) that firms’ future debt ratios are closely related to
their initial debt ratios, we also include the firm’s initial long-term debt ratio (LTDF) as
an additional independent variable capturing unobserved between-firm heterogeneity. 19
We use the estimates from regression (6) to proxy the deviation from target
leverage with the difference between the predicted value, LTD*, and the actual long-term
debt ratio, LTD. 20 We then examine whether these deviations affect how firms refinance
their maturing debt. A significant problem with this approach is that most of the
determinants of target leverage used in regression (6) can also be thought of as
determinants of debt capacity (Fama and French (2002)). 21 Therefore, one could view the
deviation of the firm’s debt ratio from the predicted value, LTD*-LTD, as a proxy for
how close the firm is to its debt capacity. As a result, even if the proportion of maturing
debt refinanced with new debt issuance (the slope coefficient in regression (5)) did vary
with the distance from the predicted debt ratio, such a finding could imply either that
target leverage ratios were important or that firms generally followed the pecking order
of financing, but deviated from it when constrained by their debt capacity. 22

value of common equity (data 60) plus the par value of preferred stock, or the book value of assets minus
total liabilities (data 181).
19

The initial debt ratio is measured as the firm’s chronologically first nonmissing debt ratio available on
Compustat. To avoid identity in each firm’s initial year, all initial years are dropped from regression (6).
20
The results of estimation of regression (6) are not reported for brevity. These results are standard and are
available upon request.
21
Indeed, Agca and Mozumdar (2007) use a similar set of variables as determinants of debt capacity.
22

This is known as the complex version of the pecking order theory (Myers (1984)).
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Fortunately, our empirical approach allows us to differentiate between the target
leverage and the debt capacity interpretations of LTD*, as these two hypotheses have
different predictions with respect to the intercept in regression (5). Specifically, there is
no reason, under the tradeoff theory, to expect firms to exhibit preference for internal
financing. This is especially true for firms with debt ratios well below their target level.
Whereas a firm with excess leverage (low LTD*-LTD) may be inclined to use cash to pay
down a portion of its maturing debt, a firm with leverage deficit (high LTD*-LTD) should
show no such preference. Thus, we would expect the intercept in regression (5) not to be
negative, especially, for high LTD*-LTD firms. In contrast, under the pecking order
theory, firms always prefer internal funds, regardless of their position with respect to the
debt capacity.
5.1. Subsamples based on deviation from predicted leverage
We, first, test these hypotheses by estimating regression (5) separately for firms sorted
into quartiles on the basis of their estimated deviation from predicted leverage, LTD*LTD. These results are presented in Table 7. 23
The pattern of intercepts observed across the quartile subsamples is not consistent
with the tradeoff hypothesis. Specifically, the intercepts in the first three quartiles of
LTD*-LTD are very similar and imply that these firms refinance small amounts of
maturing debt (up to 1.2-1.4 percent of assets, on average) with internal funds, after
which they start issuing new debt. The intercept in the highest LTD*-LTD quartile is
substantially more negative, implying that these firms use exclusively internal financing
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The results are qualitatively similar when we first split the sample in two based on whether LTD*-LTD is
positive (leverage deficit) or negative (leverage surplus), and then split each subsample in two based on the
median values of leverage deficit and leverage surplus, respectively.
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when the amount of maturing debt does not exceed about two percent of total assets. 24
Within the tradeoff framework, these would be the most underlevered firms in our sample
and, as such, they should be less likely to use internal equity and more likely to issue
debt.
The significantly negative intercepts observed across all four subsamples are more
consistent with the pecking order theory modified to account for limited debt capacity.
Because of adverse selection costs, firms always prefer to finance small amounts of
maturing debt with internal funds. Hence, the intercepts are negative regardless of where
the firm stands relative to its debt capacity.
The slope coefficient estimates imply that, as the amount of maturing debt
becomes too large to be financed internally, firms with little spare debt capacity (low
LTD*-LTD) start replacing each additional dollar of maturing debt with a dollar of new
debt. When firms with more spare debt capacity (high LTD*-LTD) start issuing new debt,
however, they not only replace each marginal dollar of maturing debt with new debt, but
also issue additional debt so that the amount of internal funds used to refinance maturing
debt declines with the size of debt due. In effect, these firms replenish their internal
financing slack using proceeds from debt issuance. For example, for firms in the fourth
quartile, when maturing debt is at two percent of total assets, it is 100 percent internally
refinanced. By the time the amount of maturing debt reaches four percent of total assets it
becomes 100 percent refinanced with new debt. This type of behavior makes sense if the
costs of adverse selection incurred when issuing debt are, to a significant extent, fixed.
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Calculated as 0.028 / 1.457 = 0.0192.
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5.2. Regression results
To simultaneously take into account the effects of both availability of internal
funds and deviation from predicted leverage, LTD*-LTD, we estimate an expanded
version of regression (5), allowing both the intercept and the slope to vary with
accumulated cash as well as with LTD*-LTD.
DISRit=α×(γ0+γ1Cashit+γ2(LTD*it-LTDit))+β×(δ0+δ1Cashit+δ2(LTD*it-LTDit))×Rit+εit =
= α0+α1Cashit+α2(LTD*it-LTDit) + β0Rit +β1Cashit×Rit +β2(LTD*it-LTDit)×Rit + εit.

(7)

In (7), Cashit and deviation from target leverage, (LTD*it-LTDit), are measured at the
beginning of period t.
Reduced form coefficient (α) estimates for regression (7) are presented in Table 8.
The results provide support for the complex version of the pecking order theory with
limited debt capacity. The intercept in the regression (-0.004) is insignificantly different
from zero and the slope coefficient of R (1.037) is insignificantly different from one.
These results imply that a firm that has no financial slack and is unconstrained by debt
capacity refinances one hundred percent of its maturing debt with new debt issuance.
Consistent with the pecking order theory, the coefficient estimate on cash is
significantly negative whereas the coefficient on the interaction term Cash×R is
insignificant. The negative effect of cash on the intercept implies that the probability of
debt issuance declines with the size of the firm’s cash position. The insignificant effect of
cash on the slope implies that, for firms that issue debt, the proportion of debt in total
new financing is unaffected by the firm’s cash position. These results are consistent with
the hypothesis that firms issue debt only after exhausting internal sources of funds.
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Consistent with the debt capacity hypothesis, the interaction effect (LTD*-LTD)×R
is significantly positive indicating that the proportion of maturing debt that is refinanced
with new debt increases with debt capacity, LTD*-LTD. The coefficient on (LTD*-LTD)
itself, however, is insignificant, implying that firms always prefer internal funds over
external debt regardless of their position relative to their debt capacity.
To summarize, consistent with the pecking order theory, firms prefer internal
funds to debt issuance when they refinance their maturing long-term debt. This relation is
unaffected by whether the firm is under- or over-levered. Firms tend to use less new debt
to refinance their maturing debt when they are closer to their debt capacity.
6. Conclusions
We test the pecking order theory by examining how firms finance maturing longterm debt. Our results offer support for the predictions of the pecking order theory
regarding the use of internal funds and debt financing. Managers first finance their
maturing long-term debt with internal funds and then turn to new debt issuance.
These findings are confirmed over different periods of time, across firms of
different sizes, with different access to credit markets, and with different levels of
internal funds. In contrast to the earlier literature, we find very strong support for the
pecking order theory among small high growth firms as well as among debt capacity
constrained firms. Our results also show that the fraction of new debt used to refinance
the marginal dollar of maturing debt declines with the extent to which the firm is close to
its debt capacity. However, regardless of their spare debt capacity, firms always prefer
internal funds to external debt.
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ESSAY 2:

Specified Purpose Acquisition Companies

1. Introduction
In the year 2007, 67 initial public offerings, or 23% of total IPO market activity,
went to the little known Specified Purpose Acquisition Companies (hereafter SPAC). In
2008, 17 out of 50, or 34%, of IPO deals were SPACs. 25 In contrast, in the period
between 1998 and 2002 there were no SPAC related IPOs; in 2003, there was only one.
Interestingly, in the first half of 2009, there was no SPAC activity in the equity issuance
markets at all.
This recent development in capital markets demands a closer examination of
SPACs and their characteristics. A SPAC is a clean shell company that acquires public
status through the IPO process and is specifically formed to purchase one or more
operating businesses over a certain amount of time, usually two years. Proceeds raised
through the IPO are placed in escrow accounts and are kept there until SPAC founders
are able to close the deal with potential targets. If an appropriate target is not found
within the two-year period after the IPO, the SPAC is liquidated and funds from the
escrow accounts are returned to investors.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) classifies SPACs as blank check
companies under the 6770 SIC code, and technically defines them as “very small
companies” typically involving speculative investments that fall within the SEC’s
25

Ritter (2009) “ Some Factoids About the 2008 IPO Market “
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definition of “penny stocks” or "microcap stocks.” At the same time, the SEC’s rule 3a51-1 excludes from the formal definition of “penny stocks” any stock issuer with total net
assets valued higher than $5 million after the IPO. Since all SPACs entering capital
markets after 2003 raised more than $5 million through their IPO, they are not classified
as penny stock blank checks, and they consequently avoid the scrutiny of the SEC rules
that apply to penny stocks. 26
The academic finance literature on SPACs is still in the very early stages of
development. Jog and Sun (2007) wrote the first paper that both explains some of the
characteristics of SPACs and examines the realized returns to original founders and
investors. Their sample includes 62 SPACs over the 2003-2006 time period, and is based
on a subsample of 24 companies with available data on SPAC founders with annualized
returns of 1900% to them. In a similar subsample that includes 42 SPACs with complete
data on SPAC investors, the authors report a negative annual return of 3%. Boyer and
Baigent (2008) examine characteristics of 87 SPACs that went public from June 2003
until December 2006 and report that SPACs exhibit less underpricing than regular IPOs.
They also report a significant positive relationship between the share price at the issuance
and the size of the offering. Flores (2008) also mentions SPACS, comparing reverse
mergers with penny stock issuances as an alternative way to go public. He includes 12
SPACS in his sample of 408 reverse mergers. Recently, Lawellen (2008) made an
argument that SPACs represent an important entity in the capital markets and that they
should be considered a separate asset class. Finally, Jenkinson and Sousa (2009) analyze
58 SPACs that completed mergers showing that half of the deals were value destroying.
26

As the response to speculative activities in blank check markets during the 1980s, the SEC introduced
rule 419-a in 1992 to regulate offerings of blank check companies. Within that legislation, rule 3a-51-1
defines what is considered a blank check and penny stock issuer.
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Beyond the academic finance literature, the redevelopment of SPACs in the
capital markets has also received much attention in law related literature. Reimer (2007)
concludes that SPACs can be considered a beneficial financial innovation, especially due
to the constraints that the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act imposed on small firms attempting to
raise funds in the public markets. He considers SPACs a substitute to private equity
firms. Sjostrom (2008) compares different ways to go public, and finds SPACs to be a
viable alternative to traditional IPOs from the perspective of an acquired company
because they bring in a cash infusion, share liquidity, and vested-in underwriters.
There is no general agreement on the performance of SPAC securities, their
characteristics, data used, or underlying indexes. We provide additional evidence on
SPAC activity in the period from 2003 until July 2009. Our analysis shows that securities
issued by SPACs react differently when the intention to change their corporate status is
announced. While the holders of all three securities realize abnormal returns, the
strongest effect is observed among the investors holding warrants; stock holders, on the
other hand, tend to react very mildly. In addition to this finding, we demonstrate that the
presence of Early Bird Capital as the lead underwriter of the IPO increases the likelihood
of a successful merger combination.
This paper is organized as follows: Part I constitutes the introduction in which we
define SPACs. Part II provides a short history of the blank check market, as well as a full
description of modern SPACs, their sample and characteristics, and important stages in
their limited corporate life. Part III examines the characteristics of SPAC stakeholders,
namely SPAC founders, SPAC underwriters, and SPAC investors, and sketches their
incentives. Part IV examines SPACs’ performance at different stages of their corporate
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life, while comparing results with SPACs reported in previous studies. Part V offers a
conclusion and proposes some further research questions on SPACs.
2.

Sample and SPAC description

2.1 History of blank check market
Modern SPACs in the period between 2003 and 2009 represent an innovative way
to reestablish blank check markets, which have long existed in similar forms. According
to Cowing (1957), blank checks as blind pools were first mentioned in England during
the 18th century. 27 Graham and Dodd (1934) explain that blind pools were imported to
US capital markets from UK capital markets in the form of so-called “investment trusts”
in the early 1920s. 28 More recently, blank checks gained popularity among certain classes
of promoters and investors in the US during the 1980s and 1990s. They were mostly
penny stock issues with shares listed on OTC markets and with very limited guarantees to
initial investors. The lack of regulation and the enforcement of existing rules led to a
certain pattern of behavior where blank check promoters frequently took advantage of
original investors. Reimer (2007) quotes several SEC hearing reports according to which,
by the end of 1980s, fraud and abuse in the penny stock market reached “epidemic
proportions.” 29 In order to protect capital formation and keep investor confidence intact,
Congress passed the Penny Stock Reform Act (1990), which instructed the SEC to adopt
rules that govern registration statements filed by blank check companies issuing penny
27

During England's 18th century South Sea Bubble, an unknown promoter raised money through a stock
offering for a "company carrying on an undertaking of great advantage, but nobody is to know what it is."
28
“The American “investment” trusts functioned as blind speculative pools, administered in many cases by
men of reputation and ability who were carried away by the universal madness. These new “creations”
played a double role in intensifying the speculative orgy, for they were themselves both active speculators
and active media of speculation.” Graham and Dodd (1937)
29
The management team would exercise its warrants in conjunction with the supposed merger with or
acquisition of a private company with the hope that the market would respond favorably to such an
announcement. Once the stock price jumped, the management team profited by dumping its shares.
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stocks. In 1992, the SEC introduced rule 419-a, which established regulation of the blank
check market.
Rule 419-a explicitly outlines the behavior of all promoters involved in blank
check offerings. 30 It requires blank check companies to keep raised funds in specially
established escrow accounts maintained by an insured depository institution until the
acquisition is consummated. The rule also determines that acquired businesses must have
net assets of at least 80% of the funds deposited in the escrow accounts. The rule
prohibits the trading of blank check securities until a merger or acquisition occurs. In
addition, blank check companies’ founders are required to provide investors with audited
quarterly and annual financial statements.
The increased scrutiny of the blank check market by the National Association of
Securities Dealers in 1997 led to a revocation of licenses of chief executive officers of
GKN Securities Corporation, the main promoter of blank checks. 31 After the event,
activities in the blank check market ceased until 2003. In August 2003, the small
investment bank Early Bird Capital underwrote the first SPAC in an attempt to
reestablish the blank check market. By raising more than $5 million through the IPO and
by pricing securities above the minimum price that would classify them as penny stocks,
SPAC underwriters and founders avoided the scrutiny of the SEC rules that regulate
penny stock markets, and instead became subject to the rules for general companies.
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SEC Release 33-6932 summarizes Rule 419-a requirements.
NASD News Release 1997 “ From December, 1993 through April, 1996, GKN dominated and controlled
the immediate after-market trading in eight securities it underwrote, which resulted in no competitive
market. GKN was able to charge excessive markups ranging from six percent to as much as 67 percent
over the prevailing market price in more than 1,500 transactions. At least 90 percent of these transactions
were fraudulent because the mark-up exceeded 10 percent (a level considered fraudulent).” As a result, the
CEO of the company and twenty nine supervisors and brokers were fined and suspended.
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From August 2003 until July 2009, 161 SPACs raised capital, and today their securities
are listed on all major US stock exchanges.
2.2 Modern SPACs
A. Formation
SPACs are formed by their sponsors with the unique purpose to acquire or merge
with other companies using the cash previously raised through the IPO. The process is
complicated; in addition to the involvement of SPAC sponsors, it requires the expertise of
legal advisors and underwriters in order to comply with the rules imposed by the SEC
and by the exchanges on which SPACs list their shares.
The formation of a SPAC is announced by filing an S-1 registration statement
form with the SEC. The S-1 form consists of all the important information regarding the
SPAC’s organization and intentions. It is a very lengthy document that includes a
certificate of registration, a registration statement, an underwriting agreement, securities
certificates, an escrow agreement, and the auditor’s consent. The form provides details
about sponsors’ professional and academic backgrounds and disclosures to potential
public investors regarding the risks involved in the process from the moment of the IPO
until the merger. It also informs investors about corporate governance and compliance
with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In the S-1 form, SPAC sponsors state their compensation
levels at all stages of the life of the company.
Once the SEC verifies the S-1 form, the focus of SPAC sponsors or managers
turns toward the IPO process.
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All the important information governing the IPO is

recorded in the final prospectus Form B423.
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On the average it takes 221 calendar days from the filing of the intention to raise funds until the IPO.
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B.

IPO event
Typical SPACs conduct an IPO by selling units. Usually, each unit consists of one

common share and one warrant to buy a share in the future at a discounted price. 33 The
use of cash proceeds raised through the IPO is determined in the registration statements
and their amendments. Typically, about 5% of raised cash is used to pay upfront for
underwriters’ fees, regular administrative and legal expenses, the cost of office space, the
cost of registering securities, and employees’ monthly salaries. The remaining 95% of the
funds are placed in an escrow account opened with an insured depositary institution,
where the funds earn a T-bill rate until they are used in an acquisition. 34
The establishment of an escrow account is very important in this process. First, it
demonstrates to potential investors the SPAC’s voluntary compliance with SEC rule 419a, which requires blank check companies to establish an escrow account. Second, an
escrow account provides assurance to public investors that a majority of their funds is
going to be preserved independently of the success of the business combination.
While the SEC’s rule 419-a forbids penny stock companies from trading
securities until the merger is consummated, SPAC founders and underwriters offer
immediate trading in units after the IPO. The units are, on average, dissolved 45 days
after the IPO, and only then can trading of underlying shares and warrants commence.
The commencement of separate trading in shares and warrants is conditional on the
approval of the underwriter and the filing of the 8-K form with the SEC, which includes
an audited balance sheet reflecting the proceeds from the public offering, as well as an
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The structure of Units changed over time, and while in the first few years the Unit would usually consist
of 1 share and 1 warrant to buy 2 common shares, lately a Unit more often consists of 1 share and 1 warrant
to buy 1 share, and sometimes even 3/4 or 1/2 of the warrant.
34
Federal Deposit Insurance Act defines what represents “insured depositary institution “ in section 3 (c )
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over-allotment exercise of units by underwriters, if necessary. While warrants are
tradable immediately after the approval of the underwriter, they cannot be exercised until
the completion of a business combination.
The units of SPACs, along with their shares and warrants, are traded on OTC
markets, AMEX/NYSE and NASDAQ. 35 At first, and especially in the 2003–2005 period,
SPAC units, shares, and warrants were listed and traded on illiquid OTC markets. In
2005, AMEX decided to allow the listing of SPACs, while imposing on them rules
regulating the minimal capital requirements, governance, compliance with Sarbanes
Oxley, and the minimum price share. Compliance with listing rules was not sufficient to
guarantee the actual listing on the exchange for every SPAC, but AMEX made the
decision on an individual basis. In 2008, both NASDAQ and NYSE filed with the SEC to
allow SPACs to list their securities. The main listing requirements for SPACs on all
exchanges are presented in Appendix II.
C. Exit: Merger or Liquidation
The IPO date represents the first day of the public life of the SPAC. But, unlike
for the majority of other existing public corporations, it also determines very precisely the
last day of the SPAC’s life. Because SPACs are formed with the unique purpose of
acquiring or merging with other businesses over a limited period of time, the date of two
years after the IPO event on average represents the last day of their public life as an
original entity. If SPAC managers are unable to find a business combination in that given
time frame, the SPAC is dissolved and existing public investors are entitled to distribute
funds from the escrow account proportionate to their share holdings.

35

On May 23, 2008, NYSE listed Heckman Corporation as its first SPAC.
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The two years provided to SPAC promoters to find a proper business combination
could be extended for an extra six months, assuming that the SPAC files a letter of intent
with the SEC to undertake a merger. Few SPACs in the sample with a focus on business
combinations in Asia have extended the allowed time frame any longer due to expected
regulatory troubles in China. Goldman Sachs, as the lead underwriter of the Liberty Line
SPAC, argued in its public announcement of intentions that the time frame for SPAC
sponsors to execute business combinations could impact both the identity of the potential
investors in the SPAC and the success of the merger. Goldman Sachs proposed that
SPACs should be given a longer time than the usual two years to conduct a business
combination. 36 It reasoned that the longer the time period between the IPO and the
potential liquidation, the higher the chance to attract long term investors, such as pension
and institutional funds.
The time limit for liquidation is also affected by stock exchange listing rules. In
the early years, SPAC securities were traded at OTC markets, and consequently at
AMEX, but the strict set of rules governing the time limit to liquidate SPAC was not
established at that time. In most cases, a limit of 24 months was self-imposed by founders
and underwriters. In 2008, two larger exchanges, the NASDAQ and the NYSE,
announced plans to list SPACs and extended the time for finding a target to 36 months.
In prospectus forms filed with the SEC, SPAC founders usually specify the
industry or country target for their acquisition; however, they are not obliged by any
formal rule to abide by this specification. They are required to file regular quarterly and
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In order to broaden interest among long term investors, this SPAC was structured to lower the percentage
of shares owned by founders (7.5% instead of standard 20%), to lower the number of warrants in each unit,
and to lower the underwriter’s fee. On May 28, 2008, Goldman Sachs announced that was unable to raise
proceeds as planned and dissolved the Liberty Line SPAC.
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annual financial statement forms with the SEC and to report any potential changes in
their corporate status. Usually SPACs use the 8-K form or the 425 form to announce a
business combination and to inform the public about it. In the announcement filing, the
SPAC’s management explains the structure of the proposed business combination, and
specifies the name of the target and the name of the new company if a merger occurs.
As a disclaimer to the announcement form, SPACs inform the shareholders that
more details will be provided in the SEC-required joint proxy prospectus. They also state
that the consummation of the deal is subject to the approval of the minimum percentage
of public shareholders, as predetermined in the IPO prospectus forms filed by the SPAC.
The joint proxy prospectus forms follow the announcement of the business
combination. Depending on the nature of the deal, there could be several of these forms,
including preliminary information statements and preliminary proxy statements related to
merger and acquisition, followed by definitive information or a definitive proxy
statement. All of these forms record procedures and events surrounding the merger
approval process, and provide full disclosure of the target business. This process can be
time consuming since the SEC first reviews preliminary forms and then provides
feedback to SPAC management. Only after the SEC approves the final content of the
proxy statement forms can SPAC management create a definitive proxy document to
send to shareholders. 37
After the announcement of the merger combination and the approval by the SEC
of the definitive proxy statement, the major task for SPAC managers is to obtain the
support of shareholders for the proposed business combination on the actual date of the
37

Based on my conversation with SPAC promoters and underwriters, I conclude that they believe that the
time spent by the SEC on reviewing these proxy statements was especially long during first few years of
SPAC revival.
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vote. All shareholders are entitled to vote on the business combination. In order for the
deal to be approved, it cannot be rejected by more than a certain percentage of its
investors as determined at the time of the IPO.
In the period between 2003 and 2006, typically the no-vote threshold was set at
20% of shareholders votes. After 2006, that threshold was set on average at 30%. In
reality, that means that if more than 20% of shareholders voted against the proposed
business combination, the merger process would be suspended and the SPAC liquidated.
If the SPAC announces its liquidation, all shareholders are entitled to divide the funds
kept in the escrow accounts based on the number of shares they own.
If SPAC shareholders approve a business combination, SPAC managers together
with their underwriters and legal counselors file new forms and notify the SEC of the
issuance of securities related to the business combination. Finally, the 8-K form
demonstrates that the remaining shareholders of the SPAC approved the transaction. That
means that all of the funds held in the escrow accounts are released to the SPAC
management and become available for use by the newly created company.
2.3 The sample
After the first modern SPAC completed an IPO in August 2003, 263 SPACS
registered to issue securities, and until July 1, 2009, 161 of them successfully conducted
an IPO raising close to $23 billion in total proceeds. The focus of our study is on 161
SPACs that conducted an IPO. The data for the study is derived from various sources.
The Edgar database is used to collect all relevant statistics on SPACs--from the
initial filing of the preliminary prospectus S-1 forms, through the final prospectus 424-B
forms and additional 8-K forms, to the 10Q statements filed immediately after the IPO. In
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this paper, all of our reported statistics are derived from the aggregation of collected
information in those forms and we have all the relevant data for the 161 SPACs that we
analyzed.
The data on daily stock returns for 99 companies in the sample was extracted
from the CRSP database. For the additional 50 companies, we collected daily prices
using Bloomberg and Reuters platforms. We found data on SPAC unit prices and warrant
prices from Bloomberg and Reuters, where we collected unit daily data for 111
companies and warrant daily data for 80 companies.38 Table I shows that out of 161
SPACs, 71 completed a merger by July 2009, 41 are still looking for an appropriate target
or have announced a potential business combination, and 49 have been liquidated or have
announced liquidation.
3. Stakeholders and their incentives
3.1. Founders
The original SPAC founders are usually former or current executives who come
from a variety of industries. In the financial press they are called SPAC sponsors, SPAC
managers, or SPAC promoters. The filing forms reveal that SPAC sponsors come from
all spheres of life, as well as from different areas across the globe. In some SPACs,
managers disclose their involvement in blank check markets before 2003. Recently, some
of the SPAC founders are investment companies, hedge funds, and private equity funds,
where private equity managers see SPACs as a path to access public capital markets.
Very often SPAC founders have previous experience in merger and acquisition activities.
In most cases, five individuals are founders of a SPAC.
38

Daily prices on SPAC securities are becoming more readily available , but the major obstacle is the fact
that vendors do not maintain historical unit and warrant data after SPACs either conduct a merger or
liquidate
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A. Typical investment
SPAC founders usually contribute $25,000 at the moment the shell is formed. In
our sample, as shown in Table II, on average their initial investment is $57,000
representing 100% of the SPAC equity. This equity stake represents, on average, 4.16
million shares, costing each SPAC founder approximately $0.0137 per share. A typical
SPAC founder discloses in the S-1 form the intention to devote a few hours of work per
week to the SPAC and warns future investors of possible conflicts of interest due to
involvement in similar competing companies. SPAC founders also inform investors about
the high uncertainty of the merger’s success. If compensated, the average annual salary of
a SPAC founder is $75.000.
B. Typical payoffs for SPAC founders
SPAC founders raise funds by selling 80% of their equity stake through the IPO.
The remaining 20% of equity remains with them and becomes more or less a finder’s fee
in the case of a successful business combination. Besides the initial equity investment,
founders commit to buy upfront, on average, 3.75 million warrants at an average price of
$0.95. Based on a founder’s initial investment, as disclosed in the forms registered with
the SEC, we can analyze their potential gains conditional on the successful merger, as
shown in Figure I.
Assuming that the share-conversion ratio during the merger is one, we calculate
potential gains for SPAC founders in absolute dollar value, depending on changes in the
stock price and assuming a post-merger warrants’ exercise. On average, SPAC managers
contribute $3.619 million to the company, either through initial investment or warrant
purchases.
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The founders’ contribution represents 2.76% of total funds that a SPAC keeps in its
escrow accounts. Assuming that the SPAC founders would not buy any additional shares
later in the process, a simple calculation shows that any post-merger stock price higher
than $1 means a positive return to the SPAC founders. 39 Therefore, the way for managers
to achieve a positive return is to find an appropriate target and to successfully close the
merger transaction.
In the case where the merger does not materialize for any reason and the SPAC is
liquidated, promoters are neither entitled to any return on their initial investment, nor
compensated for warrant purchases; consequently, they lose all of their initial investment.
The failure to find the proper target could impair the reputation of the SPAC promoters
and vice versa. For example, managers of Chardan China, who successfully executed a
merger in November 2005, were later able to raise funds for four additional SPACs of
which three already found proper business combinations.
3.2 Underwriters
The first modern-era SPAC, which completed an IPO in August 2003, created the
underwriter EarlyBirdCapital. 40 The role of the underwriters in the life of SPACs is
manifold.
First, underwriters carefully structure offerings of SPAC securities in order to
make the SPAC interesting for potential investors. Second, underwriters serve as marketmakers for SPAC units, shares and warrants and determine when they can be traded.
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The assumption that SPAC founders are not going to buy any additional shares during the process could
be questionable due to the so called “yield game” where for some investors it may be rational to opt for
SPAC liquidation instead of approving the business combination
40
The Millstream Acquisition Corporation is the first SPAC that did an IPO in August 2003, and the first
one that successfully completed a merger in 2004.
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Finally, underwriters provide their proprietary knowledge and serve as advisors to the
parties involved.
Out of 161 SPACS that conducted an IPO, all but five followed the same format
in structuring their offerings by issuing only one class of units. This remaining five
SPACs, having HFCP/Brenner Securities as their lead underwriter, issued two types of
units, with two classes of shares and two classes of warrants. 41
A typical SPAC, as shown in Table II, raises $126.4 million in gross proceeds in
its IPO. 42 On average, the underwriter’s fee is 7% of the gross proceeds. The fee is
divided into 3.94%, which is paid to the underwriters at the moment of the IPO, and
3.06%, which is deferred and paid conditionally on the successful merger. The deferred
part of the underwriter’s compensation has a motivational role for underwriters, and at
the same time, serves as a positive signal to investors. This deferred part of compensation
aligns the incentives of the underwriters with the incentives of the SPAC founders, with
respect to the final outcome.
Final prospectus forms provide information on the allocation of units to the
underwriters involved in the issuance process and on the size of the underwriters’
syndicate. Table III provides an overview and lists leading underwriters either by the
number of deals in which they were lead underwriters or members of the syndicate or by
the average number of units they issued.
According to final prospectus reports, 95 underwriters in total took part in the
SPAC unit issuance process. An average the SPAC that issues 14.85 million units is
41

In the deals underwritten by HCFP, the insiders on average buy only 100 common shares at a total cost
of $500. They have also purchased a large number of warrants prior to the completion of the IPO
42
The amount of 126.4 million represents the proceeds raised in the case the underwriter does not exercise
an over-allotment option. Full exercises of an over-allotment option would increase the amount of gross
proceeds by 19.9 million on average.
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being serviced by a syndicate of 3.64 underwriters. Four of the underwriters, either as
lead or co-lead, were involved in more than 25% of all SPACs that successfully
conducted an IPO, while one underwriter was involved in 46% of all SPAC IPOs.
A high level of syndication was common between 2003 and 2006. The success of
the first SPACs in finding appropriate targets for merger and an increased demand for
SPAC securities in the investment community brought large players like Citigroup and
Deutsche Bank into the market as underwriters and promoters.
According to our data, Citigroup is the leading underwriter in terms of the total
number of SPAC units issued to the public. Panel B shows that five underwriters were
lead underwriters and promoters in more than 10% of all SPAC IPOs, with Early Bird
Capital being the lead underwriter for 20% of the SPACs. 43 Interestingly, investment
banks that were participants in underwriting syndicates in more than 20% of the IPOs
were never leading underwriters alone. We conclude that SPAC underwriting is a
specialization of few banks and that the average size of an underwriting syndicate is more
than four times lower than a typical IPO, as reported in Aggarwal (2000).
3.3. Investors
A. Overall characteristics of investors in SPACs
On average, investors are, as presented in Table II, buyers of a 78.2% equity stake
in a SPAC during the IPO. By purchasing SPAC units they provide 97.24% of cash to the
SPAC. The remaining 2.76% comes from SPAC sponsors through warrant purchases and
initial investments.
Both in registration statements and in the final prospectus, SPAC investors are
informed about the management of cash proceeds before the IPO. Around 96% of funds
43

EarlyBirdCapital considers SPACs as their trademark

41

raised through the IPO are placed in an escrow account with a well-established financial
institution.
The funds in escrow serve as a downside benchmark for all potential public
investors in the SPAC and assure them if a proper merger is not found, then about 96% of
the invested funds would be returned. Depending on the SPAC’s management decision,
the interest earned on the funds in an escrow account can be used as the working capital
for the acquisition of related expenses.
The establishment of the escrow account is not the only way for public investors
to protect themselves against the failure to find a merger target. Investors can get back,
on average, 96% of their investment, even if a merger is announced and agreed upon, just
by opting for cash conversion of their shares. Between 2003 and2006, if more than 20%
of public investors opted for share conversion, the merger would be terminated and
SPAC dissolved, with all funds from the escrow accounts returned to public investors. In
recent prospectuses, the upper limit on the fraction of converted shares that trigger
termination of the merger and dissolution of the SPAC is usually 30-35%, and, in some
cases, even 40%. This increase in the percentage of investors necessary to stop a
proposed merger is most likely a response by founders of SPACs and underwriters to
shareholders’ activism.
Investors in a SPAC who own 78.2% of shares while contributing 97.24% of the
capital experience share dilution. In addition to dilution due to the discounted price that
SPAC founders pay for equity, public investors also might experience dilution due to
possible cash conversion by investors who disagree with a proposed merger and want to
opt out of the SPAC.
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In Figure II, the share dilution is calculated for a typical SPAC in our sample,
assuming that warrants have no value and that the underwriter did not exercise overallotment shares.
On average, across the sample new investors realize a share dilution close to
29.30% if a possible conversion of shares is not accounted for. In the majority of
prospectuses, SPAC underwriters and sponsors calculate the maximum share dilution that
could be realized if 20% of investors convert their shares. Considering that a conversion
of shares would decrease the net tangible book value of the SPAC for 20%, while
keeping the number of remaining shares constant, our dilution (2) measure shows that a
maximum share dilution of 43.40% for remaining investors is theoretically possible.
After the trading of SPAC securities is established, the primary market investors
are able to adjust their holdings in secondary markets based on the expectations of future
payoffs. Given that investors purchase units that are later disbundled into shares and
options to buy additional shares if a merger occurs, there are many possible strategies for
investors during the two-year period before a final decision on a merger is made. For
example, investors who believe in the vision of SPAC founders and are committed for a
long term, can simply keep their shares and warrants in their portfolios as they anticipate
post-merger gains.
B. Incentives of investors in respect to exit
SPAC investors have different strategies to maximize their initial investment.
Figure III shows a possible strategy that would make SPAC investors unwilling to
proceed with the merger unless they identify value in creating a merger. 44 In recent
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The T-bill rate used in figure III to calculate potential yields represents the prevailing rate in 2007 and
2008.
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SPAC offerings, it is common that almost 100% of gross proceeds are placed in escrow
accounts. This feature enables certain investors to play a so-called “yield game” by
immediately selling warrant securities and opting to convert shares into cash at the
moment of merger. As shown in Figure III, the investors could realize positive returns of
around 7% by applying a similar strategy. Obtained returns to yield players are positively
related to the willingness of SPAC managers, underwriters, or third party investors to
proceed with the deal. This potential strategy is well known to SPAC promoters and
underwriters, who are essentially forced to keep track of the identity of investors, as well
as their opinions about proxy voting to approve the merger. 45
Assuming that the SPAC investor is a leveraged hedge fund with a leverage of 5 to 1
and an initial investment of $160,000 of its own funds, we calculate a potential total
return of 78% over the life of the SPAC. The return could be higher if SPAC sponsors
are forced to buy shares above trust/per share value in order to secure enough votes to
approve the merger.
The uncertainty about merger success caused by the conflicting interests of SPAC
founders and investors was the leading reason for changes in the percentage of investors
that can veto the merger. 46

In the most recent SPACs that conducted an IPO, the

percentage of investors that could veto mergers was as high as 40%.

In an attempt to increase support for the merger, SPAC promoters in their proxy statements before the
vote said this: “Prior to exercising conversion rights, shareholders should verify the market price of
common stock, as they may receive higher proceeds from the sale of their common stock in the public
market than from exercising their conversion rights.”

45
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If investors buy shares when they trade below the net asset value, it could be in their best interest to reject
the deal. Some investors could be interested only in short term profits, which is not necessarily in the best
interest of the SPAC.
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4. SPAC performance
In this section, we describe important events in the life of SPACs, such as the
IPO, the merger announcement, and the merger itself. In addition, we analyze the
performance of the SPAC securities.
4.1 The IPO
A. Filing statistics
In Table III, the characteristics of 161 SPACS that conducted an IPO are
presented as they are in the final prospectus forms. On average, at the IPO, SPACs issue
14.85 units at an average price of $7.84. 47 The average gross proceeds before the
underwriter’s decision to exercise an overallotment option are $126.40 million, out of
which $119 million is placed in an escrow account. This represents about 95% of the
gross proceeds on average, and does not show any change with respect to the preliminary
prospectus. On average, the underwriter’s fee is 7% of the gross proceeds; the fee is
divided into 3.94% paid at the moment of IPO, and the rest of the 3.06% is deferred and
paid conditionally on a successful merger. On average, SPAC managers purchase 3.75
million warrants at a price of $0.95, and place them into an escrow account.
Table I also presents the summary statistics based on information presented in the
423B-3 forms of all 161 SPACs, with the sample divided into two sub-samples. The first
sub-sample covers time the period between from January 2003 and April 2006, and the
second sub-sample covers the period between April 2006 and July 2009. There are two
reasons for doing this. First, it allows us to see the changes in the SPAC structure over
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The majority of the units are structured as one share plus one warrant. To buy one additional share, the
average unit has one share and one warrant which provides an option to buy 1.28 shares. There are 10 unit
offerings in which a warrant is buying less than 1 share in the future date.
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time, such as the increase in the average IPO size, the decrease in the number of shares
that warrants can buy, and the increase in the deferred compensation to underwriters.
Second, it divides the sample at the point where Jog and Sun (2007) completed their
observation of the process.
Comparing the two periods, SPAC founders on average offered 106.00% (18.34
vs. 8.90) more units in the later period, and sold units at 22% higher a price (8.40 vs.
6.89), which typically led to a 147% increase in gross proceeds from the first to the
second period, and implies an overall stronger interest in the investment community for
SPACs. The increase in gross proceeds is accompanied by an increase in the ratio of the
proceeds being placed in the escrow accounts from 91.20% in the first period to 98.00%
in the second period. This can be explained by the increased amount of commission that
underwriters deferred (0.03% of gross proceeds in the first period versus 3.20% in the
second period), as well as an increase in the amount of funds that the original SPAC
founders invested by buying warrants.
While underwriters’ total commission was around 7% in both periods, we can see
a decrease in the percentage that underwriters charged immediately after the IPO, from
7.37% of gross proceeds in the first period to 3.20% in the second period, with the
remaining compensation being tied to the success of the proposed merger. By comparing
two periods, we can see an increased commitment on the side of the SPAC sponsors
through the purchase of warrants. On average, in the first period they purchased 1.85
million warrants and in the second period they purchased 4.19 million warrants.
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B. Underwriters’ option to purchase additional units after the IPO
The first form that SPAC founders file with the SEC after the successful IPO is
the 8-K form 48 . In this form, they report what date the IPO deal was consummated as
well as information on additional unit purchases by underwriters due to oversubscription.
On average, the underwriters are allotted 2.29 million of additional units to distribute.
From our sample of 161 SPACs, the underwriters of 110 SPACs used that right and
bought an average of 1.80 million additional units, using around 84% of their total
allotment. Among the deals in which the overallotment option was used, 65 underwriters
exercised that option completely.
Aggarwal (2000) believes that in regular IPOs, underwriters strategically set up
their offerings and use a short covering strategy in order to support the share price in the
aftermarket. In the case of SPACs, the price support does not drive underwriters’
behavior due to the pre-fixed offering price of securities and the low liquidity after the
IPO.
4.2 Performance of SPACs at the IPO
A. IPO day
Academic literature on the pricing of securities around IPO events is abundant.
The majority of evidence shows that issued shares exhibit above market returns during
their first trading day. Ljungqvist (2007) compiles the literature on underpricing and
shows that the phenomena could be explained either by asymmetric information models,
48

Form 8-K reports certain material corporate events on a more current basis, and must be filed with the
SEC to announce changes that shareholders must be aware of. Companies usually have 4 days to notify the
SEC of the event. From the SEC’s point of view as long as SPACS file the 8-k form and audited financial
statement which shows that net assets are in the excess of $5 million, they will not be considered as blank
checks subject to rule 419.
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institutional theory models, or behavioral theories. We believe that none of those
explanations are applicable to SPAC offerings. The firmly set structure of the SPACs
substantially before the IPO date, the establishment of the escrow accounts where almost
all proceeds are placed, in addition to zero uncertainty about the offered unit price, create
no incentives for new investors to enter into significant speculations on the first day of
trading.
Sun and Jung (2007) calculate underpricing of SPACs at the moment of the IPO
using the following formula:
Underpricing = (P1- P0 )/ P0
where P1 represents the closing unit price at the end of the first trading day and P0
represents the original unit price as announced in the SPACs’ prospectuses. In our data
consisting of 111 SPACs with information on unit prices, we have first day trading
information for 107. We calculate underpricing in the same manner as Sun and Jog
(2007). In Panel A of Table IV, we present descriptive statistics of returns. Panel B shows
that the overall mean of first-day underpricing is 0.0001%. This is lower than the
underpricing reported by Sun and Jog of 0.38%, but the result is highly expected and the
relatively high average trading volume of 2.2 million units supports the hypothesis that
investors in SPACs have no incentives to diverge from the offering unit price on the first
trading day.
B. Performance of SPACs’ securities around the announcement of the merger
Previous findings in literature on SPACs’ performance around the announcement
of merger date are scarce, not uniform, and mostly address the performance of SPACs’
common shares. We believe that more insights on merger announcements can be
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obtained if we simultaneously analyze the performance of all three types of securities that
SPACs issue during the IPO, namely units, common stocks, and warrants. In order to
examine the behavior of these securities we form three samples with daily returns for
three distinguished SPAC securities.
Results are obtained for abnormal returns based on the market model from Brown
and Warner (1985),
Rjt = αj + βjRmt + εjt
where Rjt is the rate of return of the jth SPAC security on the merger announcement day
t, and Rmt is the rate of return of an equally weighted daily market index on day t
downloaded from CRSP. Then the abnormal return for the SPAC securities on merger
announcement day t is
ARjt = Rjt - (α0j + β0jRmt)
where α0

and β0 are ordinary least squares estimates of α and β. The parameter

estimation period is 50 days prior to the first day of the 11-day event period. In addition
to the calculation of abnormal returns around the announcement day, we calculate
cumulative abnormal returns up to seven days after the event.
Out of 161 SPACs that successfully conducted an IPO since 2003, we have
complete stock price information around the announcement date for 88. The absence of
stock price information on the remaining SPACs occurred for the following reasons.
Neither CRSP, Bloomberg nor Reuters provided stock price information for the 12
SPACs around the announcement date. In addition, we excluded from the sample five
SPACs that were issuing dual shares and pricing them differently. The rest of the SPACs
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are not in the sample because either their merger announcement date is after January
2009 or because they did not announce an intent to conduct a merger at all.
In Table V, Panel A we report that abnormal returns on SPACs’ common stock on
the announcement day is 0.85%. When abnormal returns are calculated over the two-day
period, which includes the announcement date and the day after, SPAC common shares
exhibit positive abnormal return of 1.2%. We calculate cumulative abnormal returns up to
seven days after the announcement and report in Panel B that after the first postannouncement day, returns monotonically decline to 0.047% seven days after the
announcement. As expected, the SPAC common shares do not exhibit abnormal
performance in the seven day period after the merger announcement. This is primarily
due to the fact that SPAC common shareholders can redeem their shares at pro rata value
of deposited funds in the escrow accounts independently of the merger outcome, and
therefore, they do not have much incentive to bid up the price higher at the announcement
date.
In Panel A of Table VI we report abnormal returns around the merger
announcement days to unit holders. The data on the unit daily prices comes from
Bloomberg and Reuters, and we have complete information for 48 SPACs around the
merger announcement date. Since a unit is composed of SPACs’ common shares and
additional warrants that are exercisable only after successful merger combination, it is
interesting to observe the behavior of unit holders around the announcement of a merger.
For 48 SPACs that have information on unit prices, an average unit consists of one share
and 1.134 warrants.
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On the day of the announcement, unit holders experience a 2.42% positive
abnormal return. When an abnormal return is calculated for the two-day period, which
includes the announcement date and the day after, the abnormal return is 3.43%. When
we calculate cumulative abnormal returns for up to seven days after the announcement,
we see that the total cumulative return for unit holders is 7.88%. This finding is
interesting and, based on a reported lack of significant overperformance of SPAC
common shares around the merger announcement, leads us to conclude that unit
abnormal returns are largely driven by performance of warrants.
Finally, we examine the behavior of SPAC warrants around the merger
announcement date. The data on warrant prices is the hardest to obtain primarily because
historical warrant prices are not kept on record once warrants are exercised, and in some
cases are not reported at all. Data is easier to obtain for SPACs that conducted their IPO
in the last two years. Although we have collected data for daily warrant prices on 80
SPACs from the sample, the data needed to thoroughly estimate returns around the
merger announcement date is available for only 24.
Warrant holders experience significant abnormal returns on the day of the
announcement and these returns are reported as 11.11% in Panel A of Table VII. Similar
performance is observed on the first day after the announcement where we see an
additional 4.20% abnormal return. Interestingly, this strong positive reaction lasts only
for these two days and on the second day after the announcement, abnormal returns
became negative, leading to a cumulative abnormal return of 6.6% seven trading days
after the announcement. A positive reaction of warrant prices after the merger
announcement is expected.
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C. Performance of SPAC securities around the merger
Mergers are the desired final outcome for SPACs. It should be a natural outcome
that mergers create value for all the participants. We test behavior of SPAC securities
around the merger date and in Table VIII Panel A, we report results for equity
performance. We have daily stock returns on and around the merger dates for 48 SPACs
that completed mergers. SPAC equity holders experience a negative 3.81% return on the
day of merger completion. On any post-merger day, up to seven days after the merger,
SPAC equity holders experience a negative abnormal return. Panel A reports the
cumulative abnormal return for the seven days after the event as -9.59%. This finding is
interesting, but not unexpected since the merger date is determined in advance when the
merger is approved by shareholders. It might also be due to premium prices that parties in
favor of the merger were paying for shares before the voting day.
In Panel B we present results on abnormal returns for warrants on and around the
merger date. Only eight companies have available data. On the merger day, warrant
holders earn a 4.76% abnormal return, while the cumulative return for seven days after
the merger is 7.36%.
D. Overall Performance of SPAC securities
In Table IX we show the buy and hold performance for three SPAC subsamples
based on their merger status. Panel A of Table IX includes SPAC companies that
completed a merger. We calculate the buy and hold return for a hypothetical investor who
bought one SPAC unit on the IPO date and was holding that unit until the last week of
June 2009. There are 66 companies with available data in the first subsample and the
average buy and hold unit return for each is -28.69%. SPACs that successfully completed
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a merger offered on average 7.33 units for sale at the IPO; their unit consisted of 1.43
warrants and their average size calculated by the dollar amount of IPO proceeds was
$98.875 million. This finding is interesting primarily because the first SPAC shareholders
initially had the power to veto the merger, and as a result of not exercising this power at
that moment, they tended to engage in value-destroying activities.
Panel B of Table IX presents the characteristics of the second subsample, which
consists of companies that already announced a merger but currently are in the process of
approval. There are 16 companies with available data and on average they exhibit a 9.6%
positive buy and hold unit return from the IPO date until the last week of June. On
average, these SPACs are larger than SPACs that already completed mergers ($177
million vs. $98 million), have fewer warrants per unit (1.25 vs. 1.43) their units are
offered at the higher price at the time of IPO (8.5 vs. 7.33), and they have a higher
percentage of gross proceeds deposited into the escrow accounts (98.6% vs. 93.3%). Two
potential explanations for why unit investors in this subsample experience positive
returns are as follows. First, investors are willing to bid up the price of either shares or
warrants, assigning a high probability for value-creating transactions. Second, SPAC
founders and underwriters under pressure to complete the merger are buying out original
SPAC investors at prices higher than the original value. 49
In Panel C of Table IX, we calculate buy and hold unit returns for SPACs that
conducted an IPO but are still seeking a merger as of the last week of June 2009. The
subsample consists of 23 companies that on average raised $233 million at the IPO and
whose warrant consists of 0.97 units. As of the last week of June they experienced -
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The limited data we have points to the second possibility
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8.22% returns. Panels D and E show some characteristics of SPACs that liquidated and
the whole sample, respectively.
4.3 Merger determinants
Although the approval of the merger is fully in the hands of a qualifying
percentage of investors during the merger voting process, we try to examine the
possibility that additional SPAC characteristics could impact the success of the merger.
By analyzing available data on 161 SPACs that completed an IPO and applying
probit estimation procedures, we test the likelihood of the merger success on the set of
SPAC characteristics:
Merger success = f (Set of SPACs characteristics)
where SPAC characteristics are the gross amount of IPO proceeds, the number of
warrants in unit, the unit price at IPO date, the percentage of funds deposited in the
escrow accounts, the underwriter’s name, the size of the underwriter’s syndicate, and the
share dilution.
As reported in Table X, the likelihood of a successful merger for SPACs increases
with respect to the unit offer price, number of warrants per unit, and the presence of
EarlyBirdCapital (EBCAP) as the lead underwriter. The likelihood of a merger decreases
with respect to an increase in the size of the offering and the percentage of funds
deposited in escrow accounts.
5. Conclusion:
We examine the characteristics of SPACs and the performance of the securities
they issue, namely, units, common stocks and warrants, at important dates of their limited
corporate life. Our analysis shows that SPACs have a complex corporate structure in
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which the incentives of the founders, underwriters, and investors are interdependent and
where successful mergers result in significant returns to the founders.
We also show that different SPAC securities do not exhibit similar reactions in
response to announcements regarding their corporate status. While holders of all three
securities realize positive abnormal returns on the merger announcement day, the
strongest reaction is observed among the investors holding warrants, while common stock
holders react very mildly. This is an expected outcome bearing in mind the way SPACs
were originally structured.
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Figure 1. The financing of maturing debt under the pecking order theory
The figure presents the theoretical relationship between the amount of maturing debt, R,
and the amount of new long-term debt issued, DISR, under the pecking order theory and
in the absence of debt capacity constraints.

DISR

C

β

0
Intercept

Cash

New Debt
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Figure 2. The financing of maturing debt
Each dot on this scatter plot represents one observation in our sample, linking the amount
of maturing debt and new debt issuance.

57

Essay 1
Figure 3. The financing of maturing debt
Each dot on this scatter plot represents one observation in our sample, linking the amount
of maturing debt and new equity issuance.
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Table 1
Sample Statistics
The table presents summary statistics for the sample period from 1971 to 2006. Maturing long-term debt is
lagged debt due in one year (data 44) as a fraction of total assets. Net equity issued is equity issued
(data108) minus equity repurchased (data115), scaled by lagged total assets. Net debt issued is long-term
debt issuance (data 111) minus long-term debt reduction (data 114) plus lagged debt due in one year (data
44), all scaled by lagged total assets. Financing deficit is the sum of net debt and net equity issued. Cash is
cash and short-term investments (data1) scaled by assets. Rated is an indicator set to one f o r w h i c h
the firm has a rating (data280). Coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at 5% and 1% level
are marked * and **, respectively.
Variable

mean

median

min

max

Maturing long-term debt, R

0.033

0.016

0.001

0.993

Net equity issued, NEIS

0.045

0.000

-0.143

2.013

Net long-term debt issued, NDISR

0.052

0.011

-0.323

1.322

Financing deficit, DEF

0.096

0.023

-0.421

3.192

Cash

0.096

0.047

0

0.993

Rated

0.243

0

0

1

Sales (millions of dollars)

1,029

92

1

Maturing long-term debt / net long-term debt
issued

328,213

0.489
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Table 2
Pecking order tests
The results in the table are from cross-sectional Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of net debt issued
estimated separately for each of our 36 sample years (1971-2006). The table reports the means of the time
series of cross-sectional coefficient estimates and the associated Newey-West t-statistics. The t-statistics for
the hypothesis that the slope coefficients in these regressions are equal to one are reported in parentheses.
Financing deficit is the sum of net debt and net equity issued. Net equity issued is equity issued (data108)
minus equity repurchased (data115), scaled by lagged total assets. Net debt issued is long-term debt
issuance (data 111) minus long-term debt reduction (data 114) plus lagged debt due in one year (data 44),
all scaled by lagged total assets. Maturing long-term debt is lagged debt due in one year (data 44) as a
fraction of total assets. Pooled R2 is the R2 of a pooled time-series cross-section version of the reported
regression. Coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at 5% and 1% level are marked * and **,
respectively.
Net debt issued

Net debt issued

Coeff.

t-stat.

Intercept
Financing deficit
Maturing long-term debt

0.016**
0.427**

6.3
6.2 (-8.4)

Pooled R2

0.326

0.160

113,768

113,768

Observations

Coeff.
-0.016**
1.035**

t-stat.
-3.6
37.9 (1.3)
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Table 3
Pecking order tests by firm size quartiles
The results in the table are from cross-sectional Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of net debt issued estimated separately for each of our 36 sample years
(1971-2006). The table reports the means of the time series of cross-sectional coefficient estimates and the associated Newey-West t-statistics. The t-statistics for
the hypothesis that the slope coefficients in these regressions are equal to one are reported in parentheses. Financing deficit is the sum of net debt and net equity
issued. Net equity issued is equity issued (data108) minus equity repurchased (data115), scaled by lagged total assets. Net debt issued is long-term debt issuance
(data 111) minus long-term debt reduction (data 114) plus lagged debt due in one year (data 44), all scaled by lagged total assets. Maturing long-term debt is
lagged debt due in one year (data 44) as a fraction of total assets. Quartile 1 (4) contains the quarter of the sample firms that are the smallest (largest) in terms of
sales. Pooled R2 is the R2 of a pooled time-series cross-section version of the reported regression. Coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at 5%
and 1% level are marked * and **, respectively.
Quartile 1

Quartile 2

Quartile 3

Quartile 4

Coeff.

t-stat.

Coeff.

t-stat.

Coeff.

t-stat.

Coeff.

Intercept
Financing deficit

0.026**
0.333**

7.1
4.2 (-8.5)

0.015**
0.450**

5.3
6.2 (-7.6)

0.003
0.701**

Pooled R2

0.213

0.310

0.622

0.799

26,758

27,977

28,547

30,486

t-stat.

Panel A.

Observations

1.8
17.9 (-7.6)

0.004**
0.785**

3.4
54.3 (-14.9)

Panel B.
Intercept
Maturing long-term debt

-0.028**
1.110**

Pooled R2

0.198

0.142

0.118

0.095

26,758

27,977

28,547

30,486

Observations

-5.5
27.1 (2.1)

-0.025**
1.043**

-4.6
39.7 (1.6)

-0.013**
0.996**

-2.6
42.8 (-0.2)

0.000
0.889**

0.1
18.5 (-2.3)
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Table 4
Pecking order tests by access to public debt market
The results in the table are from cross-sectional Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of net debt issued
estimated separately for each of our 36 sample years (1971-2006). The table reports the means of the time
series of cross-sectional coefficient estimates and the associated Newey-West t-statistics. The t-statistics for
the hypothesis that the slope coefficients in these regressions are equal to one are reported in parentheses.
Financing deficit is the sum of net debt and net equity issued. Net equity issued is equity issued (data108)
minus equity repurchased (data115), scaled by lagged total assets. Net debt issued is long-term debt
issuance (data 111) minus long-term debt reduction (data 114) plus lagged debt due in one year (data 44),
all scaled by lagged total assets. Maturing long-term debt is lagged debt due in one year (data 44) as a
fraction of total assets. Pooled R2 is the R2 of a pooled time-series cross-section version of the reported
regression. Coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at 5% and 1% level are marked * and **,
respectively.
Without credit rating

With credit rating

Coeff.

t-stat.

Coeff.

t-stat.

Intercept
Financing deficit

0.023**
0.273**

9.0
11.2 (-29.8)

0.005**
0.816**

2.6
19.0 (-4.3)

Pooled R2

0.247

0.798

48,897

15,961

Panel A.

Observations
Panel B.
Intercept
Maturing long-term debt
Pooled R2
Observations

-0.032**
1.076**

-6.7
39.1 (2.8)

-0.006
0.913**

0.206

0.118

48,897

15,961

-1.8
29.3 (-2.8)
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Table 5
Pecking order tests by period
The results in the table are from cross-sectional Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of net debt issued
estimated separately for each of our 36 sample years (1971-2006). The table reports the means of the time
series of cross-sectional coefficient estimates and the associated Newey-West t-statistics. The t-statistics for
the hypothesis that the slope coefficients in these regressions are equal to one are reported in parentheses.
Financing deficit is the sum of net debt and net equity issued. Net equity issued is equity issued (data108)
minus equity repurchased (data115), scaled by lagged total assets. Net debt issued is long-term debt
issuance (data 111) minus long-term debt reduction (data 114) plus lagged debt due in one year (data 44),
all scaled by lagged total assets. Maturing long-term debt is lagged debt due in one year (data 44) as a
fraction of total assets. Pooled R2 is the R2 of a pooled time-series cross-section version of the reported
regression. Coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at 5% and 1% level are marked * and **,
respectively.
1971-1989

1990-2006

Coeff.

t-stat.

Coeff.

Intercept
Financing deficit

0.012**
0.545**

4.1
5.8 (-4.9)

0.022**
0.279**

Pooled R2

0.429

0.258

65,373

48,395

t-stat.

Panel A.

Observations

7.3
9.2 (-23.9)

Panel B.
Intercept
Maturing long-term debt
Pooled R2
Observations

-0.007*
1.006**

-2.0
25.0 (0.2)

-0.027**
1.071**

0.107

0.217

65,373

48,395

-5.3
43.5 (2.9)
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Table 6
Pecking order tests by cash quartiles
The results in the table are from cross-sectional Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions estimated separately for each of our 36 sample years (1971-2006). The
table reports the means of the time series of cross-sectional coefficient estimates and the associated Newey-West t-statistics. The t-statistics for the hypothesis
that the slope coefficients in these regressions are equal to one are reported in parentheses. Net equity issued is equity issued (data108) minus equity repurchased
(data115), scaled by lagged total assets. Net debt issued is long-term debt issuance (data 111) minus long-term debt reduction (data 114) plus lagged debt due in
one year (data 44), all scaled by lagged total assets. Maturing long-term debt is lagged debt due in one year (data 44) as a fraction of total assets. Quartile 1 (4)
contains the quarter of the sample firms with the lowest (highest) values of cash (data 1) as a fraction of total assets. Pooled R2 is the R2 of a pooled time-series
cross-section version of the reported regression. Coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at 5% and 1% level are marked * and **, respectively.
Quartile 1
Coeff.

Quartile 2
t-stat.

Coeff.

Quartile 3
t-stat.

Quartile 4

Coeff.

t-stat.

Coeff.

t-stat.

-0.017**
1.079**

-4.0
38.7 (2.8)

-0.048**
1.141**

-7.8
20.2 (2.5)

Panel A: Net debt issued
Intercept
Maturing long-term debt

-0.001
0.994**

Pooled R2
Observations

0.225
28,288

-0.2
24.3 (-0.2)

-0.004
0.976**

-1.0
30.9 (-0.8)

0.181
28,911

0.145
28,079

0.079
28,357

Panel B: Net debt and net equity issued
Intercept
Maturing long-term debt
Pooled R2
Observations

0.014*
1.158**
0.126
28,288

2.4
16.9 (2.3)

0.009
1.148**
0.100
28,911

1.8
18.2 (2.4)

-0.005
1.368**
0.081
28,079

-1.1
19.6 (5.3)

0.005
1.409**
0.034
28,357

0.5
15.4 (4.5)
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Table 7
Pecking order tests by LTD*-LTD quartiles
The results in the table are from cross-sectional Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of net debt issued estimated separately for each of our 36 sample years
(1971-2006). The table reports the means of the time series of cross-sectional coefficient estimates and the associated Newey-West t-statistics. Net debt issued is
long-term debt issuance (data 111) minus long-term debt reduction (data 114) plus lagged debt due in one year (data 44), all scaled by lagged total assets.
Maturing long-term debt is lagged debt due in one year (data 44) as a fraction of total assets. LTD*-LTD is the difference between the predicted and the actual
leverage ratios. Pooled R2 is the R2 of a pooled time-series cross-section version of the reported regression. Coefficient estimates significantly different from zero
at 5% and 1% level are marked * and **, respectively. The t-statistics for the hypothesis that the slope coefficients in these regressions are equal to one are
reported in parentheses.
LTD*-LTD Quartile 1

LTD*-LTD Quartile 2

LTD*-LTD Quartile 3

LTD*-LTD Quartile 4

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

t-stat.

-0.012*
1.034**

-2.4
28.6 (0.9)

-0.016*
1.134**

t-stat.

Intercept
Maturing long-term debt

-0.014*
0.955**

Pooled R2

0.329

0.093

0.047

0.024

20,210

20,613

20,587

20,523

Observations

-2.4
27.2 (-1.3)

t-stat.

-2.9
22.5 (2.7)

-0.028**
1.480**

t-stat.
-6.7
14.8 (4.8)
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Table 8
Pecking order tests: Regression
results
The results in the table are from cross-sectional Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of net debt
issued estimated separately for each of our 36 sample years (1971-2006). The table reports the means
of the time series of cross-sectional coefficient estimates and the associated Newey-West t-statistics.
Net debt issued is long-term debt issuance (data 111) minus long-term debt reduction (data 114) plus
lagged debt due in one year (data 44), all scaled by lagged total assets. Maturing long-term debt is
lagged debt due in one year (data 44) as a fraction of total assets. Cash is cash and short-term
investments (data 1) as a fraction of total assets. LTD*-LTD is the difference between the predicted and
the actual leverage ratios. Pooled R2 is the R2 of a pooled time-series cross-section version of the
reported regression. Coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at 5% and 1% level are
marked * and **, respectively. The t-statistic for the hypothesis that the slope coefficient on maturing
debt is equal to one is reported in parentheses.

Coeff.

t-stat.

Intercept

-0.004

-0.8

Cash

-0.135**

-7.3

LTD*-LTD

0.004

Maturing long-term debt

1.037**

Maturing long-term debt × Cash

0.384

1.6

Maturing long-term debt × (LTD*-LTD)

0.355*

2.5

Pooled R2
Observations

0.3
40.5 (1.5)

0.166
81,925
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Figure I :The Incentives to SPAC founders
The analysis of potential value attainable to the SPAC founders for the average company
in our sample
Value in $ Value in $ million Percentage
Offering size (IPO Gross proceeds + over allotment)
Sponsors equity investment – (4.16 million shares)
Sponsors warrant purchase – 3.75 millions ($0.95)
Total capital at risk by managers

131.00
0.057
3.562
3.619
2.76

Managers investment as percentage of offering proceeds
Warrant exercise price
Share conversion ratio

6.00
1

Price of shares ($)

1.00

4.00

5.00

6.00

7.00

8.00

9.00

10.00

Number of shares (m)

4.16

4.16

4.16

4.16

4.16

4.16

4.16

4.16

Value of shares ($mil)

4.16

16.64

20.80

24.96

29.02

32.28

37.44

41.60

Num. of warrants(mil)

0.95

0.95

0.95

0.95

0.95

0.95

0.95

0.95

Value of warrants(mil)

0

0

0

0

3.75

7.50

11.25

15.00

Total value of securit.

4.16

16.64

20.80

24.96

32.77

40.78

48.69

56.60

Total capital at risk

3.61

3.61

3.61

3.61

3.61

3.61

3.61

3.61

Total return ($ mil)

0.54

13.02

17.18

21.24

29.15

37.16

45.07

52.98

14.90

359.00

474.00

586.00

Return on invest. (%)

805.00 1026.00

126.03 1463.00
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Figure II : The Incentives to SPAC investors
The average investments by founders and investors are calculated, as well as the dilution
to investors

Shares purchased
Number(m) Percentage
SPAC Promoters

Total investment
Value in $

Percentage

Avg. price per share
In $

4.16

21.00

0.057

0.05

0.013

New investors

14.85

79.00

109.757

99.05

7.84

Total

19.01

100.00

109.814

100.00

0.159

Dilution Calculations:
Value in $
Public offering price
Amnt. of funds in escrow
Total number of shares
Escrow/number of shares

7.84
105.42(mill)
19.01 (mill)
5.54

Dilution (1)
Amnt. when 20% convert
New Escrow/# of shares
Dilution (2)

Percentage

29.30
84.33(mill)
4.43
43.34
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Figure III : Possible trading strategy
An example of possible trading strategy by investors, assuming that warrants can be sold
at the price of $1 in the market anytime before the merger.

Deal Characteristics
Unit price

Trade by investor
($ )

8.00

Number of units sold (mill)

25.00

Total proceeds

(mill)

200.00

Amount of funds in trust (%)

99.00

Dollar amount in trust (mill)

198.00

T-bill interest rate

(%)

3.00

Effective tax rate

( %)

30.00

$ amount in trust after 2yrs

8.00

Warrant sale pr.

1.00

Remaining

7.00

206.43

Value per share in trust( % )

8.25

Investors gain (Value per.sh-remaining)

1.25

Annual return ( Investors gain/ Unit pr)

7.50

Leverage ratio

5.00

Initial investor’s investment ( $ thous.)

160.00

Total investment ( $ thous.)

800.00

Gain per share (Value in trust- remain)

Unit price

1.25

Total return over two years (%)

78.00

Compounding annual return (%)

33.00
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Table I :
Chronological overview of SPAC activity in the 2003-2009 period
Chronological overview of SPAC activity in the 2003-2009 period where their corporate status is presented
year by year

Year

Number of SPACs that Number of SPACs that Number of SPACs
completed IPO’s
completed merger
that liquidated

Number of SPACs
seeking for merger

2003

1

0

0

0

2004

12

1

0

0

2005

27

3

0

0

2006

38

11

4

0

2007

66

27

21

20

2008

17

21

27

21

2009

0

8

13

0

Total:

161

71

49

41

70
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Table II:
Characteristics of SPACs as on 423B Forms
The table presents the characteristics of 161 SPACs that conducted the IPO as in their final prospectus
forms. Where: Units= number of units issued, Price = price of units at IPO, ST=number of shares,
SM=management shares, PO=percentage ownership by investors, GP=Gross Proceeds, NP=Net Proceeds,
ESC=value of shares in the escrow account, MI=Management investment in SPAC,UDC=Underwriters
compensation, UDDC=Underwriters Deferred compensation, Warr=number of warrants bought by insiders,
Wp=price of warrants, UUG=over allotment units granted, Unless noted by * next to variable, all values are
in $ millions
Variables

Complete sample

Year

Mean

Max

Units (million)

14.85

90.00

Units price at IPO

7.84

ST(total # shares)
SM(# Manag. Sh)

Period 2003-April 2006 Period April 2006- Jul 2009
Mean

Max

0.75

8.90

28.50

0.75

18.34

90.00

2.50

10.00

6.00

6.89

10.00

6.00

8.40

10.00

8.00

19.01

112.50

1.55

11.53

35.62

1.55

23.26

112.5

3.75

4.16

25.87

0.25

2.62

15.00

0.25

18.20

25.87

0.75

80.00

81.00

78.70

79.00

82.00

74.00

79.90

81.00

78.90

Gross Proc. ($ mill) 126.40

900.00

9.05

60.46 188.70

6.56 165.90 900.00

16.50

PO(Investor. Sh %)

Min

Min

Mean

Max

Min

0.057

0.005

2.525

0.023

2.00

0.001

0.086

0.02

2.525

ESC

7.84

8.90

3.90

6.36

9.10

4.48

8.60

9.82

5.00

UDC (%)

7.00

20.00

1.00

7.40

20.00

4.00

6.40

9.00

1.00

UDDC(%)

3.06

5.40

0.00

0.03

3.00

0.00

3.80

1.00

5.40

Warrants (# mill.)

3.75

16.00

0.00

1.85

5.00

0.00

4.19

16.00

0.90

Warrant price($)

0.95

1.50

0.00

0.87

1.50

0.00

0.97

1.50

0.45

UUG (#units)

2.29

13.50

0.31

1.38

4.27

0.31

2.79

13.50

0.45

Manag. Investment
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Table III
Underwriters involvement in SPAC deals
The table presents underwriter characteristics over the sample of 161 IPO’s in the 2003-2009 period. In the
Panel A summary statistics on the number of underwriters per deal and number of units per deal is
presented. In Panel B 12 underwriters are ranked by the number of SPAC IPOs in which they were
involved.
#deals

Mean

Min

Max

Panel A:
Number of SPAC IPOs

161

Number of underwriters involved

95

Amount of units issued

14.85

Number of Underwriters per IPO

3.64

0.75

90

1

12

Panel B:
(Leading SPAC underwriters)
#deals involved Lead underwriter Mean (#units)

Max (#units)

Maxim Group

74

19

2.21

22.50

Ladenburg Thalmann

45

17

3.83

16.825

Early Bird Capital

42

31

3.64

7.00

Legend Merchant

40

0

0.37

1.2

Gunn Allen Financial

36

0

0.63

3.75

I-bankers

32

1

0.89

2.00

Morgan Joseph

20

16

6.36

16.02

Citigroup

18

18

24.42

80.00

Broadband

16

3

1.47

4.00

Ramius

14

2

3.45

8.33

Lazard

13

9

6.77

22.74

Deutch Bank

12

10

20.90

36.00
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TABLE IV:
Summary statistics and IPO underpricing
In Panel A daily returns data on SPAC securities obtained from CRSP, Bloomberg and Reuters is
summarized. In Panel B, underpricing of units is calculated on the day of IPO by formula Underpricing =
(P1- P0 )/ P0 where P1 represents closing unit price at the end of the first trading day and P0 represents the
original unit price as announced in the SPACs’ prospectuses.

PANEL A:
Returns statistics:
Variable
Number
Mean
Std. Deviation Minimum
Maximum
______________________________________________________________________________________
CRSP data stocks price
45197
7.065
2.700
0.02
30.80
Returns

45130

-0.0007

0.04

-0.06

1.33

SP500 RET (from CRSP)

45243

-0.00075

0.02

-0.09

0.11

Bloomberg data stocks pr.

27363

5.67

2.54

0.001

15.20

161

7.87

1.54

6.00

10.10

31495

7.80

2.87

0.0001

45.80

Warrants per units at IPO

161

1.31

0.47

0.50

2.00

Warrants excer.prc at IPO

161

5.90

0.95

4.50

8.00

Trading price of warrants

31767

0.59

0.67

0.00

6.40

Minimum

Maximum

Original Unit offer price
Trading price for units

PANEL B:
Underpricing at the IPO
Unit open price 1st day

Number

Mean

Std. Deviation

107

7.966

1.60

5.60

11.05

Unit close price 1 day

107

7.962

1.58

5.77

10.65

Underpricing 1st day

107

0.0001

0.052

-0.231

0.33

st

st

Unit Volume 1 day

90

2208047

3086264.84

200

16813700.0
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Table V:
Returns for SPACs common stock holders around the merger announcement day
Panel A presents abnormal returns on the announcement day calculated by the market model. In Panel B
we extend the observation period by one day until seven days after the announcement and we calculate
cumulative returns for each day. Panel C is graphical presentation of the results obtained in Panels A and B.
Panel A: SPAC Stock Returns around the merger announcement date:
Announcement date stock abnormal returns:
Variable
Mean
Std.Dev
0.0105292
0.0309743
Return

Min
Max
-0.0818182
0.1523178

Alpha

0.0015893

0.0053485

-0.0065305

0.0318480

Beta

0.1491343

1.3783496

-5.5826787

10.8151338

Abnormal return

0.0085756

0.0310120

-0.0770958

0.1521550

Panel B: Cumulative abnormal returns (1,2,3,4,5,6,7 and 10 days after announcement date)
Variable
Mean
Std.Dev
Min
Max
0.0130111
0.0526251
-0.0872362
0.3570612
Car 1
Car 2

0.0127385

0.0609731

-0.2296609

0.3489474

Car 3

0.0123245

0.0679592

-0.2549082

0.4174220

Car 4

0.0096026

0.0722733

-0.3031013

0.3743839

Car 5

0.0072508

0.0739745

-0.3857526

0.3076525

Car 6

0.0048525

0.0757266

-0.4282087

0.2595993

Car 7

0.0004777

0.0920902

-0.5552372

0.3082256

Car 10

-0.0025637

0.1139913

-0.5888435

0.4378687

Panel C: Graphical representation of announcement and cumulative returns:

Common stock AR
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0.015
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0.005
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Abnormal return.

0
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4

5

6

7

8

-0.005
-0.01

Days
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Table VI:
Returns for SPAC unit holders around the merger announcement day
Panel A presents abnormal returns on the announcement day calculated by the market model. In Panel B
we extend the observation period by one day until seven days after the announcement and we calculate
cumulative returns for each day. Panel C is a graphical presentation of results obtained in Panels A and B.
Panel A: SPAC Units Returns around the merger announcement date:
Announcement date unit abnormal returns:
Variable
Mean
0.0201213
Return

Std.Dev
0.0369744

-0.0061846

0.0646209

-0.4519244

0.0202665

Beta

0.2214427

1.4714179

-5.7847016

7.2536888

Abnormal return

0.0242951

0.0584504

-0.0730680

0.3506924

Alpha

Min
Max
-0.0816062
0.1606154

Panel B: Cumulative abnormal returns (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 days after announcement date)
Variable
Mean
Std.Dev
Min
Max
0.0343930
0.1214649
-0.1104080
0.8063082
Car 1
Car 2

0.0456363

0.2035615

-0.1708533

1.3982602

Car 3

0.0472249

0.2629527

-0.2089938

1.8181650

Car 4

0.0544885

0.3196409

-0.2418225

2.2132872

Car 5

0.0589535

0.3926259

-0.1794673

2.7294429

Car 6

0.0658968

0.4531131

-0.2005421

3.1477479

Car 7

0.0788217

0.5188870

-0.1777621

3.6114892

Panel C: Graphical representation of announcement and cumulative returns to unit holders
SPAC Unit AR
P
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r
c
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Table VII:
Returns for SPAC warrant holders around the merger announcement
Panel A presents abnormal returns on the announcement day calculated by the market model. In Panel B
we extend the observation period by one day until seven days after the announcement and we calculate
cumulative returns for each day. Panel C is graphical presentation of the results obtained in Panels A and B.
Panel A: SPAC Warrants Returns around the merger announcement date:
Announcement date unit abnormal returns:
Variable
Mean
Std.Dev
0.1235652
Return

Min
Max
0.1988161
-0.1304348

0.6721311

Alpha

0.0027198

0.0141125

-0.0151523

0.0553368

Beta

1.5358577

4.1435663

-1.2398772

15.8324139

Abnormal return

0.1119899

0.2025111

-0.1203337

0.6824944

Panel B: Cumulative abnormal returns (1, 2, 3,4,5,6 and 7 days after announcement date)
Variable
Car 1

Mean

Std.Dev
0.1539946

Min
Max
0.3590699
-0.7523790

0.9322721

Car 2

0.0983182

0.3614209

-0.7523790

0.9258369

Car 3

0.0866005

0.3478715

-0.4115571

0.9321125

Car 4

0.0795737

0.3825961

-0.4882695

0.8281739

Car 5

0.0604376

0.3701326

-0.4652856

0.8281739

Car 6

0.0629939

0.3292217

-0.4698862

0.7278656

Car 7

0.0660083

0.4048455

-0.5371966

0.9335521

Panel C: Graphical representation of returns to warrant holders :

Warrant returns
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Table VIII:
Performance of SPAC securities around merger date
Panel A presents abnormal returns on the merger day calculated by the market model. Panel B presents
abnormal returns for warrant holders on the merger date.
Panel A: SPAC Stock Returns at the date of merger
Merger date stock abnormal returns:

Return

Variable

Mean
-0.0348308

Std.Dev
0.1097691

Min
-0.6919786

Max
0.0603670

Alpha

0.0015059

0.0047870

-0.0055783

0.0309012

Beta

0.2217319

0.3483728

-0.4435740

1.1373777

-0.0381030

0.1126252

-0.7141556

0.0593627

Min
-0.7222378

Max
0.1062514

Abnormal return

Cumulative abnormal returns (1, 2, 3,4,5,6 and 7 days after merger date)
Variable
Mean
Std.Dev
-0.0535390
0.1336298
Car 1
Car 2

-0.0601064

0.1377891

-0.7263495

0.1045851

Car 3

-0.0626848

0.1499950

-0.8128626

0.1146014

Car 4

-0.0639884

0.1341806

-0.7339440

0.1150086

Car 5

-0.0700704

0.1521769

-0.8423757

0.1337219

Car 6

-0.0868577

0.1697321

-0.8993613

0.1267303

Car 7

-0.0959149

0.1899362

-0.9794888

0.1143827
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Panel B: Merger date warrant abnormal returns

Merger date unit abnormal returns:
Variable
Return

Mean
0.0610620

Std.Dev
0.0983477

Min
-0.0655738

Max
0.1941392

Alpha

0.0012992

0.0058442

-0.0064705

0.0103035

Beta

0.5931283

0.8500657

-0.5900071

2.0736777

Abnormal return

0.0476056

0.0842983

-0.0601677

0.1413110

Cumulative unit abnormal returns (1, 2, 3,4,5,6 and 7 days after merger date)

Variable
Car 1

Mean
0.0986542

Std.Dev
0.1701561

Min
-0.0774148

Max
0.3532671

Car 2

0.0825682

0.1975507

-0.0724781

0.4477721

Car 3

0.0943907

0.2157216

-0.0724667

0.4496380

Car 4

0.1128411

0.2714822

-0.0609575

0.6142525

Car 5

0.1263310

0.3102446

-0.0726088

0.7603781

Car 6

0.1004079

0.2814196

-0.0805649

0.7101556

Car 7

0.0736834

0.3047707

-0.2464669

0.6741769
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Table IX:
Overall performance of SPACs during the 2003-2009 period
Panel A: Buy and hold returns for companies that completed merger:
Variable
Unit Offer Price

Number
66

Mean
7.33

Std. Deviation
7.33

Minimum
6.00

Maximum
10.10

Warrants Per Unit

66

1.46

0.50

1.00

2.00

Warrant exerc. price

66

5.48

0.74

5.00

8.00

Gross proceeds in mill

66

98875.63

Original Unit offer price

66

7.7

1.54

6.00

10.10

Percentage in escrow

66

0.93

0.05

0.85

1.00

StockPrice 06_23_2009

66

2.94

2.42

0.00

8.34

Unit price 06_23_2009

66

4.84

5.55

0.00

25.02

WarrantPrice 06_03_2009

66

0.19

0.45

0.00

2.75

Return on Unit (buy and hold)

66

-0.28

0.91

-1.00

3.17

106313.11

7878.00

528000.00

Panel B: Characteristics and buy and hold unit returns for SPACs that announced a merger

Variable
Unit Offer Price

Number
16

Mean
8.50

Std. Deviation
1.36

Minimum
6.00

Maximum
10.00

Warrants Per Unit

16

1.12

0.34

1.00

2.00

Warrant exerc. price

16

6.04

1.10

4.50

7.50

Gross proceeds in mill

16

177.09

162.14

27.98

552.00

Percentage in escrow

16

0.98

0.01

0.94

1.03

StockPrice 06_23_2009

16

8.10

1.42

5.55

9.79

Unit price 06_23_2009

16

9.37

3.49

5.80

20.28

WarrantPrice 06_03_2009

16

0.27

0.22

0.01

0.65

Return on Unit (buy and hold)

16

0.09

0.32

-0.10

1.02
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Panel C: Characteristics and buy and hold unit returns for SPACs that did not announce a merger

Variable
Unit Offer Price

Number
23

Mean
9.21

Std. Deviation
0.99

Minimum
8.00

Maximum
10.00

Warrants Per Unit

23

0.97

0.10

0.50

1.00

Warrant exerc. price

23

6.44

1.01

5.00

7.50

Gross proceeds in mill

23

293.65

286.91

33.91

103.50

Percentage in escrow

23

0.98

0.01

0.96

1.00

StockPrice 06_23_2009

23

8.83

0.98

7.25

9.77

Unit price 06_23_2009

23

8.59

2.12

0.00

10.00

WarrantPrice 06_03_2009

23

0.11

0.07

0.05

0.40

Return on Unit (buy and hold)

23

-0.082

0.20

-1.00

100

Panel D: Characteristics of companies that liquidated

Variable
Unit Offer Price

Number
49

Mean
7.76

Std. Deviation
1.51

Minimum
6.00

Maximum
10.10

Warrants Per Unit

49

1.40

0.49

1.00

2.00

Warrant exerc. price

49

5.76

0.95

4.50

8.00

Gross proceeds in mill

49

105.27

79.35

18.97

414.00

Percentage in escrow

49

0.96

0.03

0.85

1.00

Panel E: Characteristics of SPAC samples with available info at IPO date
Variable
Unit Offer Price

Number
156

Warrants Per Unit

156

1.34

0.48

0.50

2.00

Warrant exerc. price

156

5.76

0.94

4.50

8.00

Gross proceeds in mill

156

137.65

160.20

7.87

1035.00

0.04

0.85

1.03

1.00

Percentage in escrow

0.957

Mean
7.85

Std. Deviation
1.53

Minimum
6.00

Maximum
10.10
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Table X:
Merger determinants
Probit estimation results are obtained when hypothesis that Merger=f(set of SPAC characteristics) is tested.
Here UNDN=number of underwriters in IPO syndicate. EBCAP=EarlyBirdCapital , CITI=Citigroup,
Maxim= Maxim group, Gun Allen = Gun Allen
Panel A: Merger outcomes
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter
Intercept

DF
1

Std.Estim
10.57

Wald.er
3.61

Chi-sq
8.48

Pr>Chi-sq
0.03

Unit Price

1

0.28

0.14

3.55

0.05

Warrant Price

1

0.45

0.39

1.31

0.25

Gross proceeds

1

-13.78

3.76

UNDN

1

-0.06

0.07

0.81

0.36

EBCAP

1

0.10

0.07

2.06

0.15

CITI

1

-0.02

0.02

1.20

0.27

Maxim

1

-0.10

0.08

1.64

0.19

GunAllen

1

0.13

0.28

0.21

0.64

13.4

0.00

81

82
The Appendix A
Table I: Q&A The description of SPACs
SPAC description
Questions
What is a SPAC?

and

main

characteristics:

Does this means it is a company with a special
purpose?
How long is that time period?
But why do SPACs go public through an IPO?

Who are the founders of SPACs?

How much capital do SPAC founders bring in
initially?
Is then the rest of the SPAC’s capital raised through
an IPO?
What is the ownership percentage of public investors
in SPACs, as providers of almost 100% of capital,?
Are SPACs identified by a different name?

Answers
SPAC stands for Specified Purpose Acquisition
Company.
Yes. SPACs are formed specifically to acquire or
merge with an unknown company over a limited
period of time.
When SPACs first started it was 18 months after their
IPO; then it was 24 months, and most recently it is 36
months.
Mainly because SPAC founders, besides past
executive experience and conviction to have a
“vision”, before IPO have $0 in assets, as well in
equity. Someone has to come up with funds for future
merger.
Executives with expertise in industries in which they
are seeking potential targets form mergers. Recently
hedge funds, investment funds and private equity also
became involved.
It is more a “change” than capital. On average they
bring in $57.000, while majority bring only $25.000
in total, and with that money they buy 4.16 millions
of shares, paying them $0.013 each.
Yes. Public investors buying ownership of SPACs,
provide close to 100% of capital.
Public investors own 80% of the shares of the SPAC;
the remaining 20% stays with SPAC founders.
The SEC classifies them as “blank check companies”
under SIC Code 6770, and the public terms them that
way very often, but SPACs differ from original blank
checks in many significant ways.
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Table II
Journey from formation to IPO
Questions, steps

Answers, description

What is the S-1 form?

The registration statement form filed with the SEC to
issue shares in public offerings. This applies to the
majority of companies, but not to “penny stocks” or
typical pre-SPAC “blank check companies.” All
SPACs use this form.
Founders of the SPAC, their legal advisers, and
underwriters work together on the form.
The S-1 form discloses all of the relevant information
in a SPAC’s life from IPO to merger. It presents a
prospectus summary, financial data summary,
description of risk factors, underwriting agreement,
legal matters, use of proceeds, dilution, proposed
business, dividend policy, management, and a
description of securities, etc.
SPACs raise funds in primary markets primarily by
selling units. They also sometimes register to issue
preferred shares.
A unit is a security that consists of one share of
common stock and one or two warrants to purchase
one more common stock at a discounted price.
Yes. As opposed to blank check companies that
comply with rule 419-a, SPAC units, shares and
warrants start trading soon after the IPO. At first,
they were traded on OTC, then AMEX listed them.
Recently, NASDAQ and NYSE listed SPACs .
Not really. They are usually exercisable later in the
business transaction or one year from the date of the
completed S-1 form.
In order to assure public investors that their funds
will be used for a unique purpose, SPAC founders
establish an escrow account and freeze 95% of funds
raised during the IPO in the account, until the point
of merger or liquidation.
The role of underwriters is probably more important
than many people realize. They primarily invented
the new SPAC structure.

Who prepares S-1 form?
What is disclosed in the S-1 form of a typical SPAC?

What are the securities issued by the SPACs?
What is a Unit?
Are the Units tradable, and if yes, where?

Can warrants be exercised anytime?
What is an escrow account?

What is the role of underwriters in the SPAC IPO?
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Table III
From IPO to merger
After- IPO events,
Questions
What happens once an IPO is done?
What is the next step?
Where can they look for the target?

What happens once they find a target?
Is the previous step the only thing required prior to
the merger?

What percentage of shareholder are necessary to vote
for the deal to be approved?
What if they have lower support than that?
Does this happen frequently?

Once a SPAC merges, what happens next?

Description &Answers
First, underwriters inform SPAC managers that unit
trading can begin. Soon after that they report on the
trading of shares and warrants.
The investors freely trade their units, shares and
warrants while managers seek the target for the
merger combination through different sources
SPAC managers are free to look for a business
merger in any industry, but mostly they rely on their
specific knowledge and focus on industries or
countries in which they have an edge.
At the moment they negotiate a potential deal with
the target, they make an announcement and inform
the investors.
No. After the announcement the most difficulty
challenges begin. First, the majority of investors must
be convinced that the deal is going to create value
for them. Second, all information about the deal must
be checked by the SEC and after the approval mailed
to investors.
It depends. It is on a case by case basis. At first the
SPAC managers need 80% of all shares to support
the deal including their own 20%. Today, they need
60% in total, and in some cases even 55%.
They cannot go further with the deal. They must
dissolve the SPAC and return the majority of the
investments to the shareholders.
In our sample, out of 161 SPACS that conducted an
IPO, 49 of them were liquidated or announced
liquidation, while 71 successfully merged.. This ratio
equals 1:1.44 .
The new corporation often changes its name, and
continues as a new corporate entity, either in the US
or elsewhere
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